

| Executive Summary

Child Abuse and Scottish Children Sent Overseas through Child Migration Schemes

Report for the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry

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Chapter 1. Introduction: Definitions, UK Numbers, Terms of Reference

1. Between the 1860s and the 1960s around 100,000 UK children ‘in need’, including many from Scotland, were sent overseas to the ‘white’ settler societies of the Empire-Commonwealth. Most had been in care homes run by voluntary societies or in some cases by local authorities. Some parents volunteered their children for emigration hoping they would benefit from better opportunities overseas. Over 90,000 UK children were sent to Canada, around 7,000 to Australia, and smaller numbers to New Zealand and Southern Rhodesia.
2. The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry (SCAI) is required by its terms of reference to consider not only abuse in Scotland but also whether institutions and bodies in Scotland failed to protect children from abuse ‘whose care was arranged in Scotland regardless of where that abuse occurred’ and to identify any ‘systemic failures in fulfilling that duty’. Abuse is defined as ‘primarily physical and sexual abuse, with associated psychological and emotional abuse’, and unacceptable practices such as deprivation of contact with siblings and ‘neglect’.
3. While SCAI’s terms of reference define a child as a person under the age of 18, child migrants were conventionally considered to be under the school-leaving age—which rose in stages in Scotland from 13 in 1872 to 16 in 1972. To consider the experiences of those above those thresholds, Appendix 1 to the Report reviews the separately organised and funded juvenile migration schemes.
4. The terms of reference require SCAI to cover the period within living memory—which for practical reasons is generally taken to be from 1930 onwards. With respect to child migration this Report goes back earlier in order to give an understanding of the culture which sustained the practice of child migration into recent times.
5. ‘Scottish’ child (and juvenile) migrants are considered to be those living in Scotland when selected for migration, while noting also those Scottish-born living in England or sent to institutions in England before being migrated. Because Scottish child migrants once overseas are not routinely identified as such in the records, there is sometimes uncertainty about their destinations. For the same reason, and knowing of abuse at some overseas destinations,

the Report considers whether some Scottish children sent to those places may also have been abused.

Chapter 2. Contexts: Empire, Demography, Scotland within the UK

1. Child (and juvenile) migration was a response to a 'pull' and a 'push'. The 'white' settler communities of the British Empire and Commonwealth were commonly regarded politically, socially, and in popular culture as extensions of the UK. Because of the opportunities they seemed to offer, large numbers of UK citizens, including very many from Scotland proportionate to its population, were emigrated to Canada and Australia, and to a lesser extent to New Zealand and South Africa. This was not described as 'emigration' but as 'overseas settlement', migration to another part of Greater Britain. In comparison with an apparently over-crowded UK, there seemed to be better opportunities in those under-populated and under-developed territories than in the UK. Politicians in Australia were especially keen to populate its territory with 'white British stock'.
2. Between 1922 and 1972, the Empire and later Commonwealth Settlement Acts' encouraged such movement with financial subsidies. Mainly they supported the overseas settlement of adults and families. However, because of high birth rates and early deaths among adults, children under 14 made up a higher percentage of the total population, especially in Scotland, than they do today. Many of them, deprived of a normal home life for several reasons, were taken into institutional care. The Acts financial support for migration enabled institutions to send selected children overseas.
3. With respect to the constitutional relationship between Her Majesty's Government (HMG) and Scotland, it was the UK parliament, containing 71 Scottish MPs, which voted repeatedly in favour of the Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts. It was the UK Treasury which imposed UK-wide taxes to provide the subsidies. Ministers and officials in London-based government departments also determined policy and liaised with High Commissioners and Commonwealth governments overseas. Some administrative responsibilities were increasingly devolved to government departments in Edinburgh, and on some matters relating to child migration these departments were consulted by colleagues in London. However, UK ministers and officials in UK departments remained principally responsible for determining and implementing child migration policy and practice.

Chapter 3. Local Authorities: Poor Law and Child Care Acts (1845-1968) and Child Migration

1. Poor Law officials in local parishes in England and Wales, from an uncertain date, shipped out some youngsters to the American colonies who had become a burden on the rates, using the authority of the 1601 Poor Law. It is not clear whether Scottish poor law statutes dating back to 1535 prompted local parishes to adopt that practice.
2. The Poor Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1845, akin to the Poor Law Act 1834 for England and Wales, empowered parochial boards to provide outdoor relief for the poor or their accommodation in poorhouses. Practice thereafter was monitored by a sequence of government departments in Scotland. Their annual reports record several thousand 'orphaned' and 'deserted' children in Poor Law care, and later also those categorised as 'separated from parents'. Legislation in 1929 brought the practice of public assistance, as it was now to be called, in Scotland and in England and Wales into conformity. Similarly, the Children Act 1948 operating north and south of the border was largely the same. It required local authorities to set up Child Welfare Departments and appoint Children's Officers, with the responsibility for children brought into local authority care.
3. However, the annual reports provided by the sequence of Scottish government departments responsible for the Poor Law and its successors from 1845 to recent times, indicate that very few children in local authority care in Scotland were ever migrated overseas. The circumstances were invariably exceptional that allowed the few children to be sent. Latterly their departure required the approval of the Secretary of State for Scotland. Far more children left local authority care because they had been adopted. Local authorities also overwhelmingly opted for the boarding out and fostering of children in need. To be noted, and not paralleled in English legislation, the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 stated that a voluntary organisation as well as a local authority could only arrange the emigration of a child in care with the consent of the Scottish Secretary of State. But child migration by that date had almost stopped.

Chapter 4. Voluntary Societies and Child Migration: Motives

1. In Scotland, as elsewhere in the UK, a substantial number of children in need were catered for in institutions, large and small, run by voluntary societies. By the mid-19th century, several were responding to new philanthropic initiatives and organising the migration and the resettlement of children overseas in that Greater Britain. This appeared to offer them not just better economic prospects but sounder environments for their moral and spiritual redemption, as these pioneers had strong Presbyterian or Episcopalian religious convictions.
2. In response, the Roman Catholic Church, whose diocesan hierarchy was restored in Scotland from 1878, was anxious to sustain the faith of Catholic children in need. Because of the limited number of Catholic families in Scotland, relying on foster care was an insufficient method, and sending their charges to Catholic but French-speaking households in Quebec was also problematic. Catholic children were therefore to be accommodated in children's homes managed, for example, by the Sisters of Nazareth or the Good Shepherd, and those children selected were to be sent only to Catholic reception homes in Australia, where there was already a Catholic presence. As an example of broader support for this programme among the hierarchy, the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement was formed in 1939 as a merger of two pre-existing bodies, followed by the Catholic Child Welfare Council, made up of representatives of diocesan child rescue societies in England and Wales.
3. More overt imperial agendas characterised the work of John Middlemore's Children's Emigration Homes and Kingsley Fairbridge's Child Emigration Society, known after the founder's death as simply the Fairbridge Society. Child migrants sent to territories underpopulated with 'white' settlers and therefore supposedly underdeveloped would benefit the Empire and themselves by resettlement and training overseas.

Chapter 5. Voluntary Societies and Child Migration: Finance

1. The capital and recurrent costs of setting up and managing all voluntary children's homes were considerable. These costs would have been insupportable if what Dr Barnardo had described as offering an 'ever-open door' had not been offset by a back door through which children in care could leave in order to make room for newcomers. Child migration to homes and institutions overseas would ease the problem, but raising the funds to outfit, send, and maintain the departed would still require more financial resources than most voluntary societies could raise.
2. The Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts, 1922-1972, allowed HMG, with its overseas partners, to subsidise the equipping, shipping and overseas maintenance of child migrants until they were aged 16. The Australian Commonwealth and State governments also contributed to meeting costs. Similarly, the New Zealand government and the Provincial Government of British Columbia provided financial aid, while HMG with respect to the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College contributed to travel and maintenance costs.
3. There is some evidence that not all the money received from all sources was spent on the care and upbringing of child migrants. It may have been diverted to other purposes.

Chapter 6. Child Migration: Obligations and Expectations

1. Voluntary societies and, to a lesser extent, local authorities selected children for migration. They were expected to secure children's consent and whenever possible that of their parents or guardians. Representatives in the UK of governments overseas to where child migrants were to be sent, and shipping companies, also had to give their approval of those selected, particularly after medical examinations.
2. Child migrants sent to Canada between the 1860s and 1920s arrived at distribution homes managed by representatives of the voluntary societies. Children from those homes were dispersed to farms and families, whose suitability was to have been assessed and approved by the distribution homes in advance. Subsequent inspections were to be carried out, and children removed and reassigned if that were judged necessary. The distribution centres were expected to report back to the sending societies, and this was an expectation also concerning children sent to other destinations by their sending agencies.
3. With respect to financial accountability, some voluntary societies which had solicited philanthropic donations included accounts in their annual reports. Expenditure by local authorities would also have been accounted for, as was HMG expenditure as authorised by the Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts. The making and renewal of agreements with each sending agency also provided opportunities for HMG to assess and re-assess child migration practices. The financial contributions of Commonwealth governments entitled them also to inspect and assess, with an implicit duty to inform UK officials of their findings.
4. Distribution centres were also the legal guardians with parental responsibilities, though Canadian public authorities pre-war seem also to have been legally entitled to act *in loco parentis* until a child was 18. Post-war, guardianship obligations were more certainly transferred from the UK to overseas governments and from them in the case of Australia and Canada to state or provincial officials, particularly in child welfare departments, who were made responsible for the well-being of child (and juvenile) migrants until they were aged 21.
5. Custodianship, the actual caring for children, was normally the responsibility of each receiving home's manager, though that was not always the case.

Chapter 7. Contemporary Evaluations of Child Migration as a Child Care Practice, 1875-1956

1. The practice of child migration was at the time always controversial. It attracted much public and political support in the UK and overseas, but it also had its critics.
2. The **1875** report by **Andrew Doyle**, a senior Local Government Board inspector, concerned children who had been in local authority care and had been sent to Canada. This report was sufficiently critical to lead to a moratorium on the sending of further children, until Canadian authorities improved their practices, as subsequently did some sending societies.
3. The **1924 Bondfield Report** generally considered that the practice of child migration to Canada had been working well, but the use of young children as unpaid labourers on farms and in homes was so disruptive on their education that it insisted that only children over the then school-leaving age of 14 should be selected and sent. This was a recommendation that ensured that from 1925 only juveniles would normally be sent to Canada, except for those sent later into institutional care in British Columbia.
4. The **Clyde Report and Curtis Report, both dated 1946**, strongly recommended improvements in the provision of childcare in, respectively, Scotland and in England and Wales, along the lines of what was already becoming best practice. But the latter also recommended that if child migration were to be resumed it must adhere to the same standards of care overseas which Curtis was insisting must become the new norm at home. Its recommendations led to the Children Act 1948, and improved childcare training and practice. What did not generally follow were equivalent improvements in childcare overseas.
5. The **1951 *Child Emigration*** report, written by the **Women's Group on Public Welfare**, argued that if child migration was to continue then substantial changes in practice were needed. One guiding principle, echoing the Curtis Report, was that the 'main consideration in selection is not only whether the child is suited for emigration but whether emigration is best suited to his particular needs'. It is not apparent that the report had any immediate impact on practice, though an early meeting of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, formed in 1951, largely endorsed its recommendations. Subsequently, however, some members did not adhere to them.

6. Two unofficial reports by **Miss Welsford** and **Miss Harrison** in **1950**, submitted to government departments in the UK following their separate visits to a selection of childcare institutions in Australia, largely endorsed child migration as a proper practice, but the reception their reports received indicate that officials were not persuaded.
7. **John Moss**, Kent County Welfare Officer and a member of the Curtis Committee, volunteered prior to a private visit to Australia to inspect institutions to which child migrants were being sent and to report his findings to the Home Office. His report, ***Child Migration to Australia, 1953***, did contain some criticisms of what he found, but on the whole he saw merit in child migration and approved of most of the institutions he inspected. This dismayed the Home Office, which distanced itself from his report, but it pleased the Australian authorities. It also encouraged HMG's advisory Overseas Migration Board to insist on a further visit to Australia to obtain more information. It was expected that such a visit would lend more support to the cause of child migration.
8. HMG's response was to dispatch to Australia a 'fact-finding mission' led by **John Ross**, the official at the Home Office with responsibility for the children's department, plus a county council children's officer and a former deputy British High Commissioner. Their report ***Child Migration to Australia. Report of a Fact-Finding Mission***, published in **1956**, reflected the principles of Curtis in its critical appraisal. Moreover, its unpublished confidential reports on many of the Australian institutions visited were generally and sometimes very critical of what they had found. Hostile responses in the UK and in Australia reduced the impact of the mission's findings on child migration practice, although from 1957, the funding agreements between the UK government and UK sending agencies contained more strictly defined obligations. But thereafter, with the number of children selected and sent abroad diminishing, UK governments continued to fund child migration without any further general inquiry. The last known party of child migrants unaccompanied by parents departed in 1970.

Chapter 8. Subsequent Public Inquiries, 1996-2018

1. The [Child Migrants Trust](#) was formed in **1987** by Dr Margaret Humphreys, a social worker for Nottinghamshire County Council. It was formed in response to inquiries by former child migrants about their past. It provides counselling and helps survivors contact family members. The Child Migrants Trust also generated much of the media and public interest, which has led to nine public inquiries being held in Australia and the UK, and these have been invariably critical of the past practice of child migration.
2. The [Select Committee into Child Migration, Western Australia](#), produced an Interim Report in **1996**. It collected data on numbers, origins and destinations of child migrants. It also gathered written and oral evidence, including testimony from former child migrants brought into the State. These raised issues about parental consent, separation from siblings, limited education, hard labour, absence of inspections, lack of aftercare, physical, emotional and sexual abuse, and the several deleterious consequences of their upbringing on their subsequent lives.
3. The **1998 House of Commons Health Committee Report [The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants](#)** acknowledged that some former child migrants had not been unhappy where they had been sent, but the testimony of others recorded deprivations, abuse, and the damaging and lasting effects of such maltreatment on their lives. The Report's recommendations concerned: creating a database to direct former child migrants, their descendants or their representatives to information about their past; offering counselling services; the establishment of a travel fund to assist with family reunions; and similar matters. It also urged the Federal Government of Australia to initiate an inquiry into allegations of serious abuse at some named institutions. The official response of HMG was to claim that child migration policies were conducted in accordance with laws at the time, but they were 'misguided'. An apology by the Prime Minister was made in 2010, and a number of other initiatives followed, including financial support for the Child Migrants Trust.
4. Meanwhile, the **Children's Commission of Queensland** was preparing a [Preliminary Report on Allegations of Abuse at St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol](#), published in **1998**. Adults who alleged that they had suffered sexual abuse as children at Neerkol were seeking damages. However, legal problems inhibited the investigation, and the Report was only able to provide the historical context in which the alleged abuses had taken place. The Report did however draw attention to matters relating to supervision and monitoring of children in care, and it also provided insight into the confusion relating to by

whom and by what criteria receiving institutions were judged to be fit to receive child migrants.

5. The [Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions](#), the Forde Report, published in **1999**, was triggered by allegations going back decades. It reviewed practice and abuse at many institutions including some in which child migrants had been placed. The Report listed many failings, and like previous reports it recorded the lasting trauma for children who had been emotionally, physically, and sexually abused. Attention was particularly drawn to St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol, the subject of the Children's Commission's incomplete investigation. A closed section of the Forde Report, finally released in 2000, was a very critical review of the practices which had allowed many children at Neerkol to suffer from a range of abuses.
6. The [Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee Report, Lost Innocents](#), published in **2001**, was similarly concerned with the damaging and lasting consequences of abuse to child migrants, and of other children in care. Written submissions were made and oral testimony gathered. Particular institutions were named to which child migrants had been sent. The Report addressed the responsibilities of the UK and Australian governments and of the sending and receiving agencies. There followed recommendations on what reparations and support should be given to victims and what legal action might be taken. It also urged that a public apology should be made, and this was given by the Australian Prime Minister in 2009.
7. [The Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Northern Ireland](#), was set up in 2012 to consider if there were 'systemic failings by institutions or the state in their duties towards those children in their care' in the years 1922 to 1995. The Report on one module, published in 2017, concerned the experiences especially of the 131 child migrants who had been sent post-war to Australia, of whom 50 gave evidence to the inquiry. The vast majority had been selected and sent from four homes run by the Sisters of Nazareth in Derry and Belfast. The evidence illuminated the sectarian motives behind Catholic child migration and challenged the notion that child migration was representative 'of its time'. The Report also commented on pre-migration medical inspections, failures to secure parental consent, and inadequate monitoring and aftercare. It also recorded that children had suffered from psychological, physical and sexual abuse, with life-affecting consequences. It judged that the Northern Ireland Government had not fulfilled its moral responsibilities, and on a number of grounds the Sisters of Nazareth were also criticised. Its recommendations included financial compensation to the abused.

8. The objective behind the [Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse](#), set up in 2013, and reporting in **2014** and **2017**, was retrospective but forward-looking. It assessed how institutions and governments in Australia had responded to allegations and instances of child sexual abuse. Its aim was to reveal where systems had failed to protect children so that it could make recommendations on how to improve laws, policies and practices and create a safer future for children. Its Reports consolidated what had already been learnt from previous investigations, but provided information about the composition of known sexual abusers and of the internal culture of the institutions in which they operated. It judged that more needed to be known about 'what creates a perpetrator'. It also considered how children might be encouraged to recognise and report abuse, and how to avoid it, and it insisted that institutions must respond effectively to allegations of abuse. Three of the case studies concern sexual abuse at institutions to which UK child migrants, including some from Scotland, had been sent.

9. The on-going [Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse](#) (IICSA), with its focus on England and Wales, opened in March 2015. Its terms of reference concern 'the extent to which State and non-State institutions failed in their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation'. It is also required to consider whether failings have been addressed and what further action might be needed. Aware that surviving former child migrants were elderly, it took as its first module the subject of child migration. Its Report, [Child Migration Programmes](#), published in March **2018**, drew on child migrants' experiences of sexual abuse, commented on the 'standards of the day' issue, and reviewed how expectations of care and practice had evolved. Having examined responses by HMG and by sending institutions, it concluded that HMG was primarily to blame for the continuation of child migration after 1945. It was a 'deeply flawed policy', badly executed by many voluntary organisations and local authorities, which HMG had allowed to continue in spite of a 'catalogue of evidence' showing children were ill-treated and abused. Its findings and recommendations were accepted by HMG, and among other actions a financial compensation scheme was set up.

Chapter 9. Standards of the Day

1. A common response to recent allegations of child abuse in the past has been that one should not judge past practice by current standards. But the issue is not what those responsible for childcare at the time did regard as abuse: rather, given their profession or 'calling', it is what at the time they should have regarded as abuse.
2. Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK were active from the 1880s, and changes in the law from 1889 to 1948 also flagged up that cruelty to children was not acceptable. Corporal punishment, though for long acceptable, was expected to be 'educative' and 'moderate', and certainly some voluntary childcare societies set standards to avoid excess. The Curtis Report in 1946 insisted that corporal punishment should be prohibited in voluntary homes as it already was in local authority children's homes. The Curtis Report also condemned verbal abuse, which lowered the self-esteem of the child. As for sexual offences against children, these were always unacceptable. Sexual abuse worried Parliament in the 1920s, was reported in the press, and was addressed in legislation before and after the war.
3. In sum, it is reasonable to expect that those responsible for childcare in Scotland should have been aware of the changing standards which should have been respected by them in Scotland, and which should have been required of those receiving child migrants into their care overseas.

Chapter 10. Numbers: Child Migrants from Scotland

1. Scotland accounted for only 11.7% of the population of the UK in 1901, falling to 10.5% by 1931. Its percentage contribution to the 100,000 child migrants sent overseas from the UK from the 1860s to the 1960s was perhaps even lower. Because of imperfect records, a database of known child migrants sent from Scotland will underestimate the total, and much speculation was involved in estimating the figures provided in this Report.
2. Around 90,000 UK child migrants left for **Canada** from the 1860s to the 1920s, after when child migration (but not juvenile migration) largely ended. The estimated total from Scotland was perhaps 8,088, though a few of them may have been juveniles. Overwhelmingly they had been supplied by Quarriers.
3. **Australia**, the destination of around 7,000 child migrants from the UK, probably received only 369 from Scotland, pre-war and post-war. The only significant numbers were supplied by the Church of Scotland, the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, and Fairbridge.
4. As for the numbers sent from Scotland to **New Zealand** by the Royal Overseas League (ROSL), a probable maximum would be 40.
5. Of the 276 children sent from the UK to **Rhodesia** and the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College, a suggested total of only 10 may have been sent from Scotland.
6. A total of 3,170 funded child migrants were sent to Australia by UK voluntary societies between 1947 and 1965, but only half of the eight sending organisations operated over the entire period. The fall-off after 1955 was noticed at the time, and probably reflected improvements across the UK in living standards, health and welfare provision, and also a better understanding of the value of sustaining family and home, or of providing equivalent surrogate care, in the upbringing of children.

Chapter 11. Selection: External Constraints

1. Only a small proportion of children who at some time had been in the care of local authorities and voluntary societies in Scotland (and elsewhere in the UK) were selected and sent overseas. Surviving records allow for some understanding of external constraints.
2. Government officials in London representing their overseas governments were expected to ensure that those children who had been proposed met required educational standards, sometimes following IQ tests, and medical inspections were also expected to confirm that they were physically healthy. Some children failed to meet acceptable standards, and were rejected. But there were still complaints from overseas about the quality of some of those who had been selected and sent.
3. This is the more surprising because further inspections by ships' doctors of migrants, including probably children, were supposed to be conducted before departure and when *en route*, followed by scrutiny by immigration officers on arrival.
4. The deportation of former child migrants from Canada, who had subsequently become a burden on Canadian social services, was a further alert to the need for careful selection.

Chapter 12. Principles: Selection and Consent

1. The presumption behind the selection and sending of Scottish child migrants overseas was that the practice was legal if the children and preferably also their parents (or guardians) had given what should have been 'informed consent'. However, doubt has been cast on the legality under Scottish law of allowing parents to abandon legal responsibility for their children. The failure of HMG to introduce regulations post-war left the issue unresolved.
2. The principles which might or should have determined selection had been articulated in several of the Reports reviewed in Chapter 7.
3. HMG failed to turn principles into regulations, but relevant government departments and advisory committees in the UK, including those in Scotland, were aware of what was intended, as were also Australian authorities and the UK High Commission. For example, experienced social workers ought to be involved in selection; whenever possible the consent of the child and of parent(s) were to be obtained; children had to pass medical examinations; their educational attainments and religious persuasion were to be recorded; siblings when possible to be kept together; and the 'paramount consideration' was to be 'whether emigration was best suited to the child's individual needs'.

Chapter 13. Practice: Selection and Consent

1. With respect to children in local authority homes, their migration overseas from Scotland had since 1891 required the consent of the Secretary of State. In 1968, that approval was also required of children being migrated from voluntary homes in Scotland, but by then the practice of child migration had virtually ceased.
2. However, post-Clyde and especially post-Curtis, improved selection procedures and securing the informed consent of children and of parents was becoming increasingly expected in children's homes run by voluntary societies, as well as by local authorities and, though variably, a post-war practice.
3. Some good practice is evident. However, lingering doubts and some concerns about the selection and consent procedures of some organisations, perhaps in some instances due to deficiencies in record-keeping, become evident from an examination of documentary sources concerning several sending societies.
4. To set against or alongside what the records of these organisations report or imply are the testimonies provided by some former child migrants. They cast doubt on whether those selected had given informed consent to their migration or whether they were in fact too young to comprehend what they were being asked to consent to, or indeed whether they had been deliberately misled. Doubts are also raised as to whether their parents were always fully aware of what giving consent to their child's migration would entail, or indeed whether they were pressurised into giving their consent.

Chapter 14. Selection: Ethnicity, Age, Gender, Siblings, Orphans, Parents, Quotas

1. Case files indicate that ethnicity was one of several criteria which affected selection. Children had to be 'white' if they were to be considered as child migrants to be sent to Australia, Southern Rhodesia and probably also New Zealand and Canada.
2. It was a matter of debate as to whether it was best to send young children who might be more easily assimilated overseas, or those older who might be better able to cope with a new world and the workload often expected of them. Records indicate that most children sent to Australia were aged 7 to 12, but increasingly those sent to Canada were very often older because their immediate destiny was to be young workers.
3. One consequence of such preferences was also a gender bias in favour of boys, but it is also likely that fewer girls were in care homes in the first place because they were more valued as home help caring for younger siblings, and from a young age they also had opportunities for employment as domestic servants in Scotland.
4. Siblings were often selected and migrated, but thereafter their separation overseas by age and gender caused distress, and is regarded by SCAI as an abuse.
5. Child migrants were commonly referred to as 'orphans', but this was rarely the case. Many had one or even two parents living. The common description of them as 'war orphans' may have led to child migrants being incorrectly told by receiving institutions that they had no surviving parents in the UK.
6. The migration of children overseas to separate them from 'unworthy' parents may also have affected selection, leading to some child migration agencies discouraging and even preventing contact between child and parent.
7. There is also some evidence that vacancies in some overseas institutions were causing them financial difficulties and that these were addressed by recruitment drives in the UK to meet quotas and thereby increase maintenance contributions.

Chapter 15. Receiving Homes: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports – an Introduction

1. Legislation relating to the care and well-being of children in the UK has often evolved in response to periodic reviews of then current practice by inspectors and other professionals. Self-governing legislators in the 'white' Empire naturally derived laws from UK practice, though the size especially of Canada and Australia, with their subordinate state or provincial governments, required adaptations to be made. Moreover, the recruitment and training overseas of an adequate number of child welfare professionals to undertake reviews was also probably a slow process, at least initially.
2. Because HMG did not have authority over self-governing territories it could not impose regulations. As a result, HMG could only attempt to influence childcare practice overseas, including by trying to persuade voluntary societies engaged in sending child migrants to ensure that receiving homes were adopting practices which were similar to those becoming increasingly expected in the UK.
3. Hence the need, first, to consider how and by whom private farms and homes or institutions overseas were approved as suitable to receive child migrants, and by whom and how frequently they were subsequently inspected. Second, it is important to know whether adequately informative reports on the care and aftercare of child migrants were regularly supplied to sending agencies, and what action was taken, and by whom, if matters emerged which caused concern.
4. Addressing such matters adequately depends on the quantity and quality of surviving and accessible documentation.

Chapter 16. Canada: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports

1. Most of the 8,000 or so Scottish child migrants sent to Canada were placed with families on farms or in homes which had been approved by the distribution centres to which they had first been sent. Suitability was usually assessed on the basis of references provided by respected community leaders. There is some indication that the Canadian authorities, as well as sending societies, were insisting that children under 14 were to be sent to school, even before the law was changed in 1925, only allowing children over 14 to be migrated and placed with families.
2. Canadian inspectors, whose numbers had been increased after the controversy generated by Andrew Doyle, became involved, and some of their reports are archived in Scotland. Care and aftercare services were otherwise the ongoing responsibility of the sending societies and in practice of their distribution centres. These entailed inspection visits, occasionally even by senior figures from Scotland. Surviving reports are in some cases substantial and informative, and reveal disappointing as well as successful outcomes, but few reports survive for some organisations.
3. Some Scottish societies sending only a few children overseas used other agencies to inspect and report.
4. With respect to inspection visits, it is probable that children were sometimes inhibited about complaining to unfamiliar visitors, particularly if they were not speaking only in the presence of the visitor. However, the records of some societies indicate that, on occasion, children were removed from unsuitable placements and allocated elsewhere.
5. It is important to recognise that child migrants (and subsequently juveniles) were often widely dispersed over the vast spaces of Ontario and Quebec. Inspection visits by representatives of distribution centres and Canadian authorities, particularly on horseback or by carriage over rough roads, were arduous, especially when weather conditions were inclement. Even conscientious operators sometimes failed to inspect on the regular basis expected.
6. Separate consideration is required of the Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School, opened on Vancouver Island in the Province of British Columbia in 1935. This was an institutional receiving home. It was to be regulated by the province's social welfare department. It was expected that periodical inspections would take place, and that reports would be written on the children and subsequently on their places of employment after they had left

the farm school and until they were age 18. Routine reports on care and aftercare may have been conducted but only a limited number of half-yearly reports, for the years 1937-46, seem to be available. However, much is known about farm school practice because in Canada such institutional care of child migrants was unprecedented and controversial. Critical reports on the care of children, including allegations of abuse, were filed. Fairbridge closed the farm school in 1951. The remaining children were transferred to foster homes, and their care and aftercare became the responsibility of the provincial government.

Chapter 17. Australia: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Report

1. Children migrated from Scotland to Australia pre-war and post-war were all sent into institutional care.
2. Placements were of course largely determined by the sending society, so that Scottish children sent by the Church of Scotland, Catholic childcare homes, Fairbridge, Northcote, Barnardo's and the Salvation Army went to their obvious partners in Australia.
3. Australian State and Commonwealth governments were involved in approving the suitability of institutions, but criteria for such approvals could differ between Australian officials and UK High Commission staff.
4. State child welfare inspectors visited and reported on institutions caring for child migrants though these do not seem to have been conducted on a regular basis. Reports on children in some institutions were not always favourable. Some visits of inspection were known of in advance and prepared for accordingly.
5. Exceptional inspections by the UK High Commission and by Australian state and Commonwealth governments were also carried out in response to particular events and circumstances, and reports were sent to HMG departments. Exceptional too were the contemporary reports reviewed in Chapter 7.
6. Local committees monitored activities at some institutions, but whether they carried out regular inspections is not known.
7. Certainly some receiving institutions sent reports on children's progress back to their senders in the UK. Reports following aftercare inspections sometimes indicated that young employees were removed from unsuitable employers and reallocated elsewhere.
8. Based on responses made to SCAI and other sources, it seems that care and aftercare reports were not routinely received or even expected by some Catholic sending societies, though some reports on individual children were sent to the Catholic Church Welfare Council.

Chapter 18. Other Locations: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports

1. Children from the UK, including probably a few from Scotland, had been admitted to the **Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College in Southern Rhodesia**. As a publicly-funded school it is likely that it was subjected to inspections by officers of the Southern Rhodesia government, but no college records survive to check that assumption.
2. The only known independent inspection report was by John Moss in 1954. He had not been impressed by the value of visits from a member of the London council which was responsible for recruiting children for the school. Moss also had reservations about the conditions in which pupils were accommodated, and he was particularly critical of the aftercare arrangements concerning employment after pupils had graduated.
3. On arrival, child migrants sent to **New Zealand by the Royal Over-Seas League** were initially under the guardianship of the Superintendent of Child Welfare. However, guardianship was later transferred to the foster parents with whom they were placed—if child welfare officials were satisfied with the care the child was receiving, if the child was more than 12 years old, and if the child had given his or her consent. Child welfare officials were still expected to visit the homes to which children had been sent and could remove and re-allocate if that were judged necessary. Guardianship responsibilities remained until the child was age 21. In reality, inspections by child welfare officials were neither as frequent, as rigorous, or as effective as expected.

Chapter 19. Conclusion: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports and Responsibilities

1. Child migration had been commonly regarded as acceptable in the past. It was increasingly criticised post-war, but the practice continued.
2. Following the Children Act 1948, officials in UK and Scottish government departments attempted but failed to devise regulations binding on the practices of child migrating societies, even inside the UK.
3. Attempts to persuade societies to adhere voluntarily to best practice in the care and aftercare of children sent overseas achieved some kind of formal recognition in the funding agreements from 1957, but by then child migrant numbers were already falling.
4. The authority of the UK government to enforce better practice overseas, perhaps by financial sanctions, was restricted by its limited authority over the self-governing dominions and its interest in Commonwealth unity.
5. Officials in Canada and Australia accepted the policy of their ministers on the need to accelerate population growth, including by the immigration of children.
6. Institutions and employees overseas were not likely to discourage child immigration because of the transfer to them of funds and of cheap labour.

Chapter 20. The Abuse of Scottish Child Migrants: Determining and Defining

1. The migration of Scottish children overseas irreversibly changed their lives. Some made good, and led more successful lives than if they had not been migrated. However, there is also evidence that even some who were outwardly successful had suffered from their upbringing overseas, or remained troubled by the distress they knew others had endured.
2. As noted in Chapter 1, SCAI's terms of reference define abuse as 'primarily physical abuse and sexual abuse, with associated psychological abuse', plus unacceptable practices (such as deprivation of contact with siblings) and 'neglect'.
3. Scottish child migrants once abroad were often not so specifically identified, so attention is given to those locations where UK child migrants, including some from Scotland, were sent and where it is known that abuse took place.
4. Written and oral testimony about abuse given to SCAI and other inquiries, plus supporting documentation, is considerable. The following chapters refer to locations, forms of abuse, the abusers and the abused, responses to abuse, and consequences.

Chapter 21. Child Abuse: 'British Home Children' in Canada

1. The self-esteem of many child migrants sent to work on farms or as domestic servants was damaged contemporaneously by publicity given to remarks made by trade unionists and medical and childcare professionals that such children were mentally, physically, and morally damaged and a danger to Canadian society. Only more recently have former child migrants been more willing to reveal their origins and record their experiences.
2. In amongst positive testimony, other 'Home Children' recall the abuse they suffered, including unreasonably hard work, poor food, loneliness, separation from siblings and limited education. Evidence given to the House of Commons Health Committee refers to physical, sexual, emotional, and psychological abuse. Academic studies have also discovered that amongst some positive experiences there were many more negative outcomes, including high illegitimacy rates among girls while wards of the homes in which they had been placed.
3. Noticeably, substantial numbers when free to move rejected the expectations of sending agencies, chose to leave rural society, and sought employment in Canadian cities.

Chapter 22. Child Abuse: Foster Care in New Zealand

1. The British Child Migrants Society in New Zealand reported to the House of Commons Health Committee that the number of former child migrants who recorded that their lives had been adversely affected by their migration substantially outnumbered those who felt that they had benefitted. Their accounts refer to abuse, ill-treatment, and neglect and to such consequences as relationship problems, separation from siblings, lost identities, discrimination, and lost opportunities.
2. Oral testimony given to the House of Commons Health Committee echoed these claims, and include a reference by a victim to her having been raped.
3. Some children were moved to other foster parents, but otherwise there is no indication that the New Zealand government were alert to the possibility let alone the actuality of risk.
4. ROSL was criticised in the IICSA Report because there had been 'no proper monitoring, reporting and aftercare of children sent to New Zealand'.

Chapter 23. Child Abuse: Institutions, an Introduction

1. A substantial number of Scottish child migrants were dispatched into institutional care in British Columbia, Southern Rhodesia and especially Australia. Their lives had already been disrupted by circumstances that had deprived them of a normal family life.
2. Even those institutions trying to recreate family life in cottage homes (as only some did) found it difficult. Children ranged from the very young to teenagers, and from the pre-pubescent to sexually self-conscious teenagers, an age range challenging even for well-trained and experienced carers.
3. Sometimes those in charge attempted to cover up cases of abuse, but some accused were put on trial and managers were sometimes obliged to resign.

Chapter 24. Child Abuse: Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School, British Columbia

1. Accessed records do not allow us to state that any children from Scotland suffered sexual abuse at this farm school, but for certain one member of staff was dismissed in 1938 for 'gross misconduct' with boys. To protect the reputation of Fairbridge, this scandal was not reported by the Principal to the police. It was followed five years later by the dismissal of another staff member for the same offence, and also because of his improper behaviour towards girls. This time no cover-up was possible because an 'Old Fairbridgian' had reported the offences to the police. The offender was tried and imprisoned.
2. Further concerns about the quality of care led to a report by British Columbia's Superintendent of Neglected Children in 1944, which referred to more allegations of sexual abuse and led to more staff dismissals. Her report also drew attention to the institution's inadequate facilities, the poor standards of children's health, the inadequacy of cottage mothers, the emotional abuse of children and resorting too often to corporal punishment. A report in 1949 by a psychiatric social worker was also critical. Although new policies were introduced, it was the decision of the local Board of Governors which led to the farm school's closure.
3. Testimony provided by witnesses to IICSA and to SCAI state that the instinct of children was to keep quiet and not report abuse for fear of punishment. What one child endured affected him later in life, sufficient for him to need counselling.
4. Although the troubled history of the farm school was at the time well-known to policy-makers in the UK, it does not seem to have altered Fairbridge practice in Australia or made HMG more alert to risk.

Chapter 25. Child Abuse: Northcote Farm School, Bacchus Marsh, Victoria

1. Inquiries conducted by the UK High Commission, the State of Victoria and the Commonwealth of Australia in 1943 and 1944 were responses to allegations of sexual abuse of girls at the school by teachers and by visiting 'old boys'. Teachers were dismissed, criminal charges were brought, and the Principal was required to resign.
2. A UK High Commission inspection in 1944 also discovered that conditions at the dairy were so poor that children had fallen sick, and that children placed out in employment were ill-prepared and too often 'unsatisfactory'.
3. The school was closed later in 1944. Post-war and in preparation for a re-opening, a member of staff was sent on a training course for house-mothers organised by the Home Office, but following her return a new principal rejected the Curtis-derived curriculum she was teaching and forced her to resign. She subsequently alleged that since her departure she had learnt that even emotionally fragile children were being strapped for misdemeanours.

Chapter 26. Fairbridge Farm School, Pinjarra, Western Australia

1. Poor standards of education, training and aftercare of children at Pinjarra seem to have been concealed until the UK High Commission and Commonwealth of Australia staff carried out reviews in 1944. These exposed 'disturbing stories' of girls becoming unmarried mothers. Sexual intercourse or 'indecent dealings' with girls under 16, as some may have been, were criminal offences.
2. Post-war there were further allegations including of young girls becoming pregnant, of girls being at risk of sexual abuse by predators associated with local committee members, and of a male welfare officer carrying out medical examination of teenage girls about which they complained.
3. Six IICSA witnesses spoke of sexual abuse at Pinjarra, of girls being molested by older girls, male members of staff, a foster parent, and an aftercare officer. Allegations by four SCAI witnesses refer, among other abuses, to violent corporal punishments, emotional as well as physical abuse by some (but not all) cottage mothers, anal rape by an older boy, a child being forced to watch an older boy commit an act of bestiality with a horse, separation of siblings, educational deprivation, poor preparation for futures, and no recollection of visits by welfare officers.

Chapter 27. Child Abuse: Fairbridge Farm School, Molong, New South Wales

1. Molong had been regarded, even by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission in 1956, as one of the better institutions accommodating child migrants in Australia, but more recent research and testimony have cast doubt on that reputation.
2. Indicative of neglect—a form of abuse—are reports in the 1950s that refer to children being malnourished and poorly educated.
3. Discipline could be excessively violent, as some examples indicate. One Principal was instructed no longer to use a hockey stick with which to beat children. A house mother was told not to use a riding crop with which to whip small children, but no action was taken against her for her treatment of a girl who wet the bed. Not only was the girl flogged, but her head was pushed down the toilet and the toilet was flushed. It is recorded that one boy spent two years in hospital after his back was broken in a beating by a staff member for bringing the cows in late for milking.
4. Allegations of sexual relations between boys and girls and of homosexual practices at Molong go back to 1940. The Principal of the college was forced to resign. Allegations of sexual abuse made against a successor were not proven, though girls later in life reported their discomfort serving as domestic helpers in his house. A later Principal also seems to have been required to resign for allegations, though not proven, of abusing girls.
5. In some but not all of these cases of alleged abuse, Child Welfare Departments were alerted by Fairbridge, but the police were not informed.
6. Subsequent public inquiries heard witness testimony concerning abuse and its legacy and concluded that Fairbridge child migrants had been abused.

Chapter 28. Child Abuse: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College

1. Few contemporary records have survived, but an understanding of children's experiences of care at the college and its legacy can be derived from retrospective autobiographical accounts. While most are positive, there are allegations of abuse.
2. Discipline at the college largely conformed to then conventional standards, but exceptional violence inflicted by some schoolmasters has been alleged. There are references to severe bruising, to a teacher 'given to fits of red-faced rage' picking up boys and shaking them 'till their teeth rattled', and of another beating a boy with his fists. One former pupil insisted that such beatings were excessive even by the standards of the day. Also some house mothers in charge of dormitories were 'outright cruel'. Some older boys assaulted younger boys.
3. There is only one reference in these autobiographical accounts to sexual abuse at the college—of a boy being pressed by one older to engage in a sexual act. However, other published memoirs refer to sexual abuse, especially one which records that the school padre was notorious for molesting boys and was later jailed for the sexual abuse of minors.
4. Pupils had holiday placements with families, and concerns were expressed at the time that such households were not vetted in advance, and children were therefore at risk. Such proved to be the case. An IICSA witness statement was provided by a woman who alleged that she had been sexually abused by the father of the family with whom she was staying.
5. The autobiographical accounts also reflect on the lack of emotional and psychological support at the college, and the 'inward scars' former pupils still carried.

Chapter 29. Child Abuse: Salvation Army, Riverview Training Farm, Queensland

1. John Moss in 1951 had regarded the quality of care and aftercare at Riverview as acceptable. However, the Ross Fact-Finding Mission in 1956 judged the accommodation to be 'primitive' and 'ablution and sanitary arrangements most unsatisfactory'. Placing child migrants in such conditions may be regarded as abuse. Concerns were raised by several boys in 1956 and 1958, but there followed no UK inspections, though the Army in the UK stopped sending children to Riverview in 1960.
2. Testimony provided to the Australian Royal Commission and to IICSA goes further. Witnesses referred in detail to cruelty and physical abuse; to emotional and psychological abuse such as the unsupportive treatment of bedwetters, and children being told their parents did not love them; and to sexual abuse by Salvation Army officers, employees, and other boys. Life-long and 'devastating' consequences are described, including nervous breakdowns, panic attacks, and relationship difficulties.
3. IICSA criticised the Salvation Army for not having a 'more robust process' for monitoring the welfare of the children it had migrated. Had that been in place, risks could have been reduced, interventions could have taken place, and children could have been protected.

Chapter 30. Child Abuse: Barnardo's Mowbray Park Farm School, Picton, New South Wales

1. In May 1958 Tom Price, the General Manager of the farm school, was alerted that boys, mainly aged 18-21, working for a farmer had been sexually abused by him. Price took immediate and proper action and informed the New South Wales Director of Child Welfare. He also alerted the police who arrested the farmer, a second employer, and three former Picton staff members. Price later added that the offences had taken place over the previous four years. Barnardo's attorneys in New South Wales contacted Barnardo's senior management in London. Price and Australian officials were at once told that Barnardo's regarded its duty to 'the State and to the Public' as more important than the preservation of its 'good name'. The Home Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and the UK High Commission were also informed. No further parties would be sent to Picton until this matter had been dealt with.
2. Meanwhile a delegation from Barnardo's in London had arrived, and in August after arrests had been made it was agreed by all parties that the matter had been cleared up, though the Commonwealth Relations Office was not willing to allow child migration to resume until it had received final reports on what had occurred and on what steps were to be taken to prevent any recurrence. Police arrests and such press reports as appeared implied that none of the abuses had taken place inside the farm school and only outside.
3. Different interests had been revealed in responses to the abuse, but it is clear that agreements on the need to stop more parties from arriving and on the importance of making immediate arrests (with only a little publicity) brought this episode to a conclusion. However, the General Superintendent of Barnardo's took this opportunity to declare that, while aftercare procedures would be reviewed, no further parties would be sent to Picton. The site was too far from the nearest town, there were staff recruitment problems, the local committee was divided over policy issues, and 'boarding out' was now Barnardo's preferred form of care. Barnardo's subsequently opened small homes in Australia but the Picton farm school was closed in 1959.
4. As for the experiences of child migrants sent to Picton, a SCAI witness has testified that he was left 'ill-equipped' for the outside world, that this led him to get into trouble with the law, and that child migrants like him were considered 'pariahs' and 'outcasts'. Though he was at Picton from 1955 to 1959 he does not mention the 1958 crisis that prompted the closure of the school.

Chapter 31. Child Abuse: Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, Tatura, Victoria

1. This farm school, to which Quarriers boys were sent, was opened late in 1950. It was heavily criticised by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission in 1956. Sending youngsters to a place so isolated, to be accommodated in a 'rambling and inconvenient building', 'bare and comfortless', with showers and lavatories 'inadequate in number and in poor condition', and with staff numbers too few to cope may in itself be regarded as an abuse, although a subsequent report by Australian officials reckoned that at least the fabric and facilities at the farm school had been improved.
2. Witness testimony presented to the House of Commons Health Committee, the Australian Senate Inquiry, the Northern Ireland Inquiry, and IICSA refer to ill-treatment, bullying, and violence by staff and older boys. They also provide grim accounts of sexual abuse by staff members, local church ministers, and lay members.
3. To those allegations of abuse can be added the testimony of SCAI witnesses. These contain yet more references to discipline being 'over the top...brutal'. One boy was left bleeding from his back and buttocks. Boys badly abusing other boys was said to be indicative of a 'depraved and brutalised culture'. Bedwetters were harshly treated. There are references to what one would call psychological abuse, and there are yet more accounts of sexual abuse, by staff and by other boys.
4. While some witnesses remember Dhurringile fondly, others struggled with the legacies of a lack of care: poorly educated and ill-prepared for life, some living in a state of anxiety, unable to form relationships, a 'man without love'.

Chapter 32. Child Abuse: Christian Brothers Institutions for Boys, Western Australia

1. The Christian Brothers were an international Catholic order which in Western Australia was responsible for four institutions: **St Vincent's Junior Orphanage** (also known as Castledare Junior Orphanage), **Clontarf Boys Town** (the common name for St Joseph's Orphanage), **St Joseph's Farm and Trade School, Bindoon**, and **St Mary's Agricultural College, Tardun**. They only accommodated boys, and at least 49 Scottish children were sent to them. Because boys were transferred from one institution to others, usually as they grew older, and because some staff too were transferred, it is sensible to consider all four institutions in one review.
2. Visits to Tardun by the UK High Commissioner in 1942 and to Bindoon, Tardun, and Clontarf by a colleague in 1944 raised some concerns about the state of the buildings, facilities and overcrowding, and indeed about their remote locations. This was wartime, but more child migrants arrived post-war, in spite of official concerns. However, John Moss in his 1953 report to the Home Office recorded that he was generally impressed by what he had seen. The Ross Fact-Finding Mission visited only three of these institutions, not Tardun, but its report and the confidential appendices are very critical of the conditions and quality of care in the homes, and in addition of the Principal at Bindoon, who 'had no understanding of children and no appreciation of their needs as developing individuals'.
3. All subsequent reports substantially endorse the critical assessment of the care which child migrants received at these four institutions: by Dr Barry Coldrey (himself a Christian Brother) in 1993 and even more explicitly in a 1994 manuscript he wrote elaborating on his findings; by the Western Australia Select Committee in 1996; by the House of Commons Health Committee in 1997; by the Australian Senate Inquiry in 2001; and by the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse in 2014. To the evidence they contain can be added the statements and testimony provided to SCAI by 18 witnesses.
4. Disturbingly graphic accounts were given of 'child slave labour' at Bindoon, of physical abuse by Christian Brothers, of the humiliation of boys suffering from enuresis, of poor food and health care, and of the absence of compassion. Even more disturbing are the vividly described accounts of sexual abuse of boys by the Brothers, by visiting Brothers, and even by other boys. Those few boys who dared to report abuse were not believed, and some were punished for making such allegations. Not only did abusing Christian Brothers protect each other, but some were moved to avoid scandal, and continued to abuse

boys at their new locations. There are suggestions that a paedophile ring existed in these homes.

5. Inspections of these institutions by welfare officers were usually known in advance and prepared for accordingly. Even unannounced inspections were more concerned with material conditions (which certainly needed attention) and not the other welfare needs of the children. There is no evidence that incidents or allegations of abuse were ever reported to the police (who may have been involved in cover-ups), or to State child welfare officers.
6. The physical, sexual, emotional, and psychological abuse of children in the 'care' of the Christian Brothers, the poor education the boys received, and the absence of aftercare had lifetime consequences for many victims, evident often in damage to their mental as well as physical health, in their difficulties in obtaining and holding down jobs, and in problems forming and maintaining personal relationships.

Chapter 33. Child Abuse: Other Catholic Institutions in Australia

1. At least 31 Scottish child migrants were sent to six other institutions in Australia. Boys only were sent to St John Bosco Boys Town, Hobart, Tasmania, run by the Salesians. Only girls were sent to St Vincent de Paul Orphanage, Millswood, South Australia (also known as the Goodwood Orphanage) or to St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco, Western Australia, both being Sisters of Mercy homes. Other girls were sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton, Western Australia, or to Nazareth House, East Camberwell, Melbourne, Victoria, both run by the Poor Sisters of Nazareth, the latter also accommodating elderly men and women, some senile, suffering from dementia. Unusually, St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol, Queensland, accommodated boys and girls.
2. John Moss had made brief but positive observations on all six of these institutions during his 1951 tour, and he was particularly impressed by St John Bosco Boys Town and St Joseph's at Neerkol. However, the Ross Fact-Finding Mission in 1956 derived a 'most unfavourable impression of the attitude of the Principal [at St John Bosco] and of the regime as described by him'. Also, the newly arrived Mother Superior at Neerkol was 'kindly' but seemed to have 'little understanding of the children's needs'. They seemed 'regimented', and were having 'an institutional upbringing in isolation from the outside world'.
3. Not even the Ross team had been alerted to signs of abuse. These were exposed in subsequent official inquiries. In 1997 the House of Commons Health Committee heard from several women that as child migrants sent to Western Australia they had received 'severe floggings', that they had had their hair shaved off, that they were severely punished for bedwetting, and that the Sisters of Mercy were described as the 'Sisters without Mercy'. Drawing on witness statements, published reports on 'care' at St Joseph's Orphanage, Neerkol, in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2014 revealed yet more evidence of abuse, as did the report of the Australian Senate Inquiry in 2001 which records allegations of sexual abuse at the orphanage by male workers, visitors and priests.
4. Witness statements by women submitted to SCAI are likewise critical of the conditions, care and upbringing they received at the Catholic orphanages, including Neerkol, to which they had been dispatched. There are again references to poor education, the mistreatment of bedwetters, cruel and humiliating punishments, and insulting remarks with humiliating effects. One girl was told that she was being punished by God. There was also a lack of sex education and no preparations for puberty—and there was sexual abuse including rape, not reported by the orphanage to the police. With respect to

inspections by Child Welfare Department staff, these were known in advance and prepared for, but the girls were not spoken to.

5. Witness statements submitted to SCAI by two men are likewise critical of the conditions, care and upbringing they received at St John Bosco's Boys Town. One acknowledges that the food, health care, and recreational opportunities were 'generally okay', but discipline was 'very harsh', and there was emotional and psychological abuse, such as being told that he was not wanted by his mother or by his country. And there was regular and repeated anal rape. The second witness recalled bullying, humiliating punishments for bedwetting, and poor education, though he was to experience worse when he was transferred to Tardun.
6. The consequences of mistreatment and abuse reported by SCAI witnesses will be familiar: enduring damage to self-respect, bouts of depression and anxiety, need for psychiatric care, limited life skills, poor education leading to problems securing employment, and difficulties forming and sustaining relationships, even with their own children.

Chapter 34. Child Migration and Child Abuse: Conclusions

1. Many child migrants are (or were) convinced that they had been rescued from poverty or neglect or abuse or poor prospects in Scotland. Their voices can be heard in archived records and indeed in the reports of recent inquiries, though such inquiries have been more likely to solicit and attract witnesses who experienced abuse and its consequences.
2. Philanthropic sending agencies had what they considered to be good intentions, especially the faith-based who believed they were doing God's work, saving souls as well as the bodies of children. But it has been argued that the righteousness of the cause obscured understanding of the consequences of inadequate care.
3. Moreover, good intentions also included the secular and the political ambition to populate the 'white' Empire, making the well-being of children 'deprived of a normal home life' a secondary consideration.
4. Even what sending agencies might regard as good intentions do not excuse bad practice. There were failures to set and enforce standards of care to match what HMG and even some voluntary societies, especially post-Curtis and post-Children Act 1948, expected to be put in place overseas as well as at home.
5. Whether the selection of children and the securing of child, parental, or guardian consent for their migration overseas were professionally and adequately done depended on the internal practice of the sending societies, on how persuasive the Home Office could be in encouraging them to upgrade those practices, and on how susceptible they were to demands from external partners overseas.
6. Compounding the difficulties in raising standards overseas was how much influence the sending societies could exercise over their overseas partners, not least in securing reports from them.
7. An instinct of adults to disbelieve children and an interest of some institutions (not all) in preventing external knowledge of abuse in order to preserve reputations left children still at risk. More is known today than was known at the time about the experiences of child migrants and the lifelong legacy of what many had endured.
8. Much of what is known about the practice of child migration has depended on the quality and quantity of the written records kept contemporaneously,

subsequently preserved, and latterly made available to public inquiries and to former child migrants or their representatives.

9. Retrospective oral and written witness testimony by a diminishing number of former child migrants has been important during recent investigations. Not only has voice been given to the voiceless, and that is important, but knowledge is needed in order to learn lessons from the past.

Appendix 1: Juvenile Migration

This Appendix reviews the policies and procedures of organisations that were involved in the migration of juveniles in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the experiences of those who were migrated.

1. *Rationale.* While SCAI is concerned primarily with child migrants, some migration schemes catered for juveniles—that is, those children over school leaving age—whose experiences have not been addressed specifically in other inquiries. In Scotland the school leaving age rose gradually from 13 in 1872, to 14 in 1883, to 15 in 1947 and 16 in 1972.
2. *Definitions, Organisations and Numbers.* Many factors make it difficult to identify, enumerate and even define Scottish juvenile migrants. These include lack of differentiation between children and juveniles in programmes administered by the same organisations; the periodic raising of the school leaving age; and the participation in migration schemes of both children ‘in need’ and those who had experienced a normal home life. Several organisations, both UK-wide and operating exclusively in Scotland, as well as local authorities, selected and sent Scottish juvenile migrants overseas. The number of Scottish juvenile migrants is largely a matter of speculation, but a rough estimate might be a total of 7,158 in the period 1900-1972. The ratio of boys to girls was perhaps 3 to 1.
3. *Origins and Development of Juvenile Migration.* The initial objective was to deter and punish criminal activity. The emphasis subsequently shifted to opportunity, within a context of imperial rhetoric, and with a focus on agricultural and domestic work in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Costs were met by charitable donations and, from 1922 to 1972, by supplementary funding under the Empire Settlement Acts, which offset costs of training, travel, and establishment as juvenile employees. Legislation pertaining to juvenile migration was also passed in the dominions.
4. *Aberlour Orphanage, Strathspey.* This institution accommodated primarily, but not exclusively, Scottish youngsters. Most who were sent overseas were child migrants, but a small proportion, about 65 in all, were juveniles. Historic records do not discuss selection policies, consent, after-care or funding, but there is evidence from case histories of adults who gave consent to the migration of juveniles and of others who refused. Entries in the *Orphanage Magazine* indicate that Aberlour liaised with other organisations involved in migration. The *Magazine* also makes occasional references to after-care, but there are no formal reports on after-care in the case files we have seen. Case files from the twentieth century indicate both problematic and positive experiences—and we know from the *Orphanage Journal* that the institution

acknowledged migration could be problematic in the late 1900s. It seems much was taken on trust, arrangements were brokered informally and patchily through personal networks, and no meaningful safeguards were taken to mitigate risks.

5. *The Barwell Boys' Scheme*. We have only limited information about this South Australian government initiative, which operated from 1922-28. It was not targeted particularly at juveniles 'in need'. It aimed to secure 6,000 teenage boys aged 15-18 and young women aged 18-21, to be apprenticed to farm and domestic service. The total number actually recruited was 1,557, including possibly around 155 from Scotland. It was opposed by the Australian Labor Party on grounds of cheap labour and inadequate welfare provision.
6. *The Big Brother Movement (BBM)*. This heavily advertised scheme was an imperialist venture, founded in London in 1925. It was not targeted at juveniles 'in need', although there is evidence that such individuals did participate. It operated intermittently until 1983, particularly in the 1920s and 1940s-50s, and may have recruited around 700 Scots out of a possible total of between 7,000 and 11,000. It was claimed in 2000 that the BBM may have accounted for 50 per cent of post-war child and youth migration to Australia. Boys ('Little Brothers') were sent initially to farm work in Victoria, and later to New South Wales and Western Australia. They were given assisted passages and parents were assured of careful after-care from a 'Big Brother' who was assigned to each recruit. It is unclear how well procedures worked, but there is evidence that the BBM was aware of problems and attempted to address them. Evidence from a former BBM recruit from Scotland, laid before the House of Commons Health Committee in 1998, makes reference to sexual abuse suffered after he had migrated as a child under the BBM and had been transferred to Dhurringile.
7. *The Boy Scouts Association*. Several juvenile migration schemes were promoted by the Boy Scouts Association before and after the Second World War, particularly to Australia. We have tentatively suggested around 400 may have left Scotland. The Association's Migration Department benefited from the Whitehead Scholarship, and also participated in external migration schemes such as the Fairbridge Farm School and the BBM. The objective was empire building through agricultural work. Scout migration was not designed for juveniles 'in need', although some such did participate. It is unclear how boys were selected, screened and consents obtained. Preparatory training and after-care seem to have been insufficient.
8. *The British Immigration and Colonization Association (BICA)*. Under this scheme, 14-18-year-old boys from farming families were offered free

passages, training and farm work in Canada under the Empire Settlement Act. It operated from 1924-41, primarily in the 1920s. Of approximately 5,500 migrants, 550 may have been Scots. Dr G.C. Cossar was BICA's Scottish agent, and 47 boys from the Aberdeen Lads' Club also migrated under its auspices. A hostel and training farm were opened, and BICA undertook to provide after-care for all boys for three years from their date of arrival. The Canadian authorities and the Aberdeen Lads' Club Secretary had serious and recurring concerns about BICA's practices and outcomes, including careless selection, prolonged hostel residence, deficient placement arrangements and after-care, poor accounting practices, and the number of recruits who left the scheme. One Scottish recruit committed suicide.

9. *The Canadian Pacific Railway Scheme (CPR)*. The exact nature and duration of the scheme are unclear, but it was probably one of several farm training and settlement projects launched under the Empire Settlement Act, most of which closed with the onset of the depression in 1929-30. Six boys were migrated from Aberlour Orphanage under the scheme in 1927. Little is known about selection, consent, placement and aftercare. In 1960 Fairbridge sent two parties of teenage boys from Liverpool to Canada as farm employees under a CPR scheme, but nothing further is known of the scheme.
10. *The Children's Overseas Reception Board 1940-44 (CORB)*. This organisation operated between June and September 1940 to evacuate British children to the dominions and the USA. Most became adolescents while they were overseas. An Advisory Council drawn from representatives of migration societies and youth organisations advised on selection, welfare, escorts and reception, with a special board for Scotland. Approximately 3,000 children were migrated, two-fifths of whom were from Scotland and Wales. We have suggested a possible Scottish total of 1,200. Documentation demonstrates that some migrants were lonely, ostracised or abused, or were themselves disruptive, and the scheme was criticised retrospectively by one of the escorts. It is unclear whether anything was done to mitigate risks.
11. *Church of Scotland Committee on Social Services (CSCSS)*. As indicated in the main Report, CSCSS recruited child migrants for Australia in the 1950s, but—unusually—perhaps around ten may have been juveniles. It is possible that the Church of Scotland in the 1920s participated in the recruitment of juvenile migrants under the auspices of Cornton Vale training farm in order to qualify for funding under the Empire Settlement Act. It is unclear who was selected and sent, and by whom.
12. *Cossar Farms*. This scheme was set up by Dr George Cossar as a specifically Scottish migration programme for juveniles from deprived backgrounds. It

probably accounted for 1,200 boys from Scotland, who were sent to Canada and Australia. Cossar operated training farms in Renfrewshire and New Brunswick. The first recruits were migrated in 1911 and from 1922 Cossar obtained funding under the Empire Settlement Act. The scheme was heavily marketed, including among Scottish local authorities and youth organisations. Cossar also liaised with Quarriers in sending out migrants. The selection process is not clear. Cossar's work was initially well received by the Canadian immigration authorities, but was subsequently heavily criticised for poor selection, supervision and after-care, especially at the New Brunswick training farm. The scheme was also criticised by some participants and parents. A number of boys were deported from Canada. Cossar never achieved his objective of establishing a training farm in Australia, and no information has been found on his after-care arrangements in Australia.

13. *The Dreadnought Scheme*. This was operated by the Dreadnought Trust. From 1911-39 the Trust migrated 5,595 British boys aged 16-19 to New South Wales for agricultural training, including up to 280 Scots. It was not targeted at those 'in need' and there were nominal arrangements for after-care. The scheme encountered problems as a result of recruits' urban backgrounds, isolation and immaturity. There were several suicides.
14. *Flock House Scheme*. This was an inter-war scheme to fund the emigration to New Zealand of the juvenile children of British seamen who had died or been injured in the First World War. It offered training in farm work and may have migrated around 76 Scots. The scheme foundered during the depression, but was briefly revived between 1949 and 1952. Concerns were expressed about selection, after-care and freedom to return to the UK.
15. *Girls' Friendly Society (GFS), the British Women's Emigration Association (BWEA), and other Female Migration Societies*. Numbers migrated under the auspices of these several organisations during the 19th and 20th centuries are uncertain, but we have suggested a total of 200 from Scotland—mainly those migrated by the BWEA, the largest operator. We lack information on selection, consent, destinations, placements and after-care in respect of all these organisations.
16. *Quarriers Orphan Homes of Scotland*. [Quarriers](#) was the largest child rescue organisation in Scotland. Its rationale was to provide opportunities and an exit door, and fulfil an imperial agenda. Approximately 35 percent of residents between 1872 and 1933 (over 7,000 individuals) were migrated to Canada. From 1922 funding was available under the Empire Settlement Acts and from the early 1920s virtually all migrants to Canada were juveniles, mainly boys, numbering an estimated 342. The Canadian movement ended in 1938. A

smaller number of children, including some juveniles were migrated to Australia between the late 1930s and early 1960s. Initial selection was made by Quarriers, after apparently asking for volunteers amongst its residents, but there is ambiguity surrounding the provision of information to children and their parents, and the granting of consent. From the outset there was recognition of the need to screen overseas placements and deliver after-care through a receiving home in Ontario. Employment and accommodation arrangements were regulated by written agreements and instructions, which were not always honoured. After-care visitation was continued, at least nominally, for a considerable time, until the migrant was 18 or even 21, and pre-placement visits were sometimes undertaken. Quarriers' activities were frequently commended by the Canadian immigration authorities, but there were also well-documented problems of laxity in inspection, negative experiences among migrants, and abuse. Quarriers' priority in addressing problems seems to have been to protect its reputation, and in the 1930s it sought to counteract opposition by articulating a willingness to work with social welfare organisations. During this period, just before and after the termination of migration to Canada, there is evidence of internal and inter-organisational friction.

17. *Reformatories and Industrial Schools*. These institutions were concerned with the institutional reform and training of young offenders, or potential young offenders. Migration of children and juveniles was an occasional resort, rather than an integral part of policy or practice, and may have accounted for up to 400 juveniles in the 19th and 20th centuries. The records of 43 institutions have been examined, but with the exception of [Kibble Reformatory](#), which may have migrated up to 148 juveniles to Canada and Australia, documentation is sparse and incomplete. There is no direct evidence relating to selection criteria, procedures for securing consent, systematic identification and scrutiny of placements, or the financing of migration.
18. *Royal Over-Seas League (ROSL)*. The ROSL has operated under various names since 1910, with branches across the UK and abroad. In 1926 it established a Migration Bureau. Probably 80 juveniles were included among those whom it sent to New Zealand and Australia, but there are no specific records relating to selection, consent, destination or monitoring. It supported the work of Fairbridge Farm School in Western Australia and Dhurringile Farm in Victoria and in 1949 inaugurated a scheme to send children and juveniles to New Zealand. HMG had reservations about ROSL's lack of expertise in selection and the absence of structures to provide reports on post-migration welfare.
19. *The Salvation Army*. Selective migration was an integral and well-documented part of the Salvation Army's strategy, but most records were lost in the

wartime Blitz—though we were made aware that some documentation of this period survives at the Canada and Bermuda Territorial Archives, and the New Zealand, Fiji and Tonga Territorial Archives. In 1903 it created a Migration and Settlement Department to promote migration, screen applicants, assist and train selected individuals, supervise passages, operate reception hostels and supply letters of introduction to employers. Its objective was to bolster the Empire and provide better opportunities, not least for youths in blind alley occupations. As many as 1,000 Scottish juveniles may have emigrated under its auspices. From 1922 it could access funding under the Empire Settlement Acts and meticulous accounts were kept. After-care, supervision and success were described in numerous pamphlets, which also countered accusations that migrants were exploited. Most post-war documentation relates to Riverview Training Hostel in Queensland, which was associated with inadequate facilities and with physical, emotional and sexual abuse.

20. *YMCA*. The YMCA's international network always included a heavy involvement with the reception and welfare of migrants, and in 1909 it established an Emigration Department. From 1922 it could access funding under the Empire Settlement Acts, and around 500 Scottish juveniles may have migrated under its auspices. Its objective was to mitigate juvenile unemployment. In the 1920s it launched a co-operative nomination scheme involving churches and charities in Britain and the dominions, with selection, supervision and after-care being organised through these institutions. It is unclear how effective the arrangements were. After the war collaborative juvenile migration schemes were renewed in both Canada and Australia but appear to have come to little.
21. *Numbers and Destinations*. The survey is not comprehensive for various reasons: poor or non-existent records; reluctance of institutions to supply records; unawareness of small institutions until it was too late to request records; and time constraints leading to sampling rather than exhaustive scrutiny. The primary destinations were Canada, Australia and New Zealand, but it is impossible to estimate numbers migrated overall, or to individual destinations. Quantification is also hampered by the changing definition of juveniles. Assigning numbers sent by particular organisations is further complicated because of networking and collaboration among different institutions.
22. *Changes in Contemporary Attitudes*. Organisations that migrated juveniles were convinced of the rectitude of their policies and practices. Benefits to individuals were articulated within a wider context shaped by imperial agendas and rhetoric. However, in the 20th century the ethics of migrating

juveniles came under increasing scrutiny from politicians, psychologists and professional child care specialists in the UK and Canada.

23. *Quality of Care, Evidence of Abuse, Deportations.* The records of large institutions indicate that they generally had clear policies regarding selection, consent, placement and after-care, as well as appropriate financial accounting systems, and that there was a genuine attempt to implement those policies. We cannot evaluate the activities of smaller institutions whose records do not exist, and which may have been less accountable. It is possible that too much was taken on trust, and that effective implementation of policies was impeded by poor scrutiny or inadequate resources. Procedures for selection, placement and monitoring were variable, and we have identified direct or indirect evidence of actual or potential abuse in a number of institutions. Return migration, particularly deportation, might sometimes be an indicator of neglect or abuse, and might suggest a failure of safeguarding procedures.

Appendix 2: Government approval and inspection systems for residential institutions in Australia

This Appendix examines the systems by which HMG and Scottish Office approved and monitored receiving institutions for child migrants in Australia after the Second World War. Drawing on relevant policy documents and primary archival sources, this Appendix indicates that:

1. both the Curtis and Clyde Reports—published in 1946—recognised the importance of regular independent inspections of residential institutions for children, with failures in systems of inspection also being a central concern in the Monckton Report published the previous year to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of Dennis O’Neill. The Curtis and Clyde Reports noted that fragmented systems of oversight could be a threat to the well-being of children in out-of-home care and recommendations for better integrated systems of government administration and oversight were central to both reports.
2. with the implementation of the Children Act 1948, systems for the administration and over-sight of children’s out-of-home care were made simpler and more coherent in England, Wales and Scotland. However, post-war child migration continued to operate on the basis of a complex administrative system involving State and Commonwealth Government departments in Australia, the UK High Commission in Canberra, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Home Office/Scottish Home (and later Education) Departments. This created conditions in which critical information was not always shared by Australian authorities with UK officials, competing departmental priorities and civil servants’ deference to the remit of other departments hindered effective policy decisions, and the Scottish Home Department received only limited information from other HMG departments (particularly in relation to voluntary societies emigrating children from Scotland whose headquarters were based in England).
3. during the Second World War, the UK Dominions Office had become aware of a series of problems with a number of receiving institutions for child migrants in Australia and, by 1945, were involved in policy discussions about whether it was appropriate for post-war child migration to resume without better systems of oversight. In 1944, an Australian Commonwealth Government official recommended to the Dominions Office that HMG should undertake annual independent inspections of receiving institutions for child migrants but this was never implemented because the UK High Commission lacked the staff resources to do this. As a consequence, in most cases, receiving institutions in Australia were approved by HMG on the basis of reports produced by

Australian State Government officials and not through any direct visits to these institutions by UK officials.

4. given this complex system of administration and oversight, and the large geographical distance over which child migrants were spread in Australia, significant flaws emerged in the monitoring of child migrants' welfare by HMG (including the Scottish Office). In 1947, child migrants were sent to residential institutions in Western Australia in breach of agreed limits for number and age and, in one case (Nazareth House, Geraldton) to an institution which had not received approval from HMG. In later years, other cases emerged of child migrants being transferred by receiving voluntary societies in Australia to residential institutions for which approval from HMG had not been sought. HMG officials also approved receiving institutions on the basis of State Government reports which often provided little information about standards of care or on the basis of assurances about standards that would be implemented in the future. This included institutions such as Dhurringile and the Riverview Training Farm which were later strongly criticised in confidential comments by the 1956 Ross Fact-Finding Mission. The Scottish Home Department only appears to have undertaken one direct inspection of receiving institutions in Australia, in 1950.
5. the case of the Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, to which child migrants were sent by the Church of Scotland and Quarriers, exemplifies flaws in HMG's systems of oversight. Initial approval for Dhurringile was given whilst the site was still under renovation and before any of its staff had been appointed. After receiving a copy of private notes from John Moss's visit to Dhurringile in 1952, the Scottish Office received no independent reports from Australian or UK officials about conditions at Dhurringile until 1956, when the Commonwealth Relations Office forwarded on highly critical confidential comments made by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission.
6. in the wake of the Ross Fact-Finding Mission's Report, the Scottish Home Department supported its recommendations for introducing regulatory controls over the child migration work of voluntary societies in the UK. This was not supported by the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office in London, however, who instead chose to implement an informal system of checks linked to the renewal of maintenance funding agreements with voluntary societies in 1957. Under this regime of informal checks, two parties of child migrants were sent to Dhurringile from Quarriers in 1960 and 1961 without the knowledge of Scottish Office officials. In addition, views expressed by the Scottish Office on the suitability of some children selected for a planned emigration party in 1962 were not fully heeded. After providing further reports on receiving institutions in 1957, there is no evidence of the

Australian Commonwealth Government forwarding on any further reports to HMG for a further three years and possibly well beyond this.

Appendix 3: Monitoring practices and other related standards of voluntary organisations and local authorities

This Appendix reviews systems used by voluntary societies to monitor the welfare of child migrants sent overseas under their auspices or from their care, setting this in the context of wider policy discussions at the time about appropriate standards. Having considered this wider context, the Appendix examines the practices of individual voluntary societies and in some cases, notes other issues that may be relevant to an understanding of their organisational cultures, structures and methods.

This review indicates that:

1. there was no legal requirement for voluntary organisations sending child migrants from the United Kingdom (including Scotland) to monitor their welfare overseas, primarily because the Home Office chose not to introduce regulations to control the child migration work of voluntary societies under s.33 of the Children Act 1948. The decision not to bring forward s.33 regulations was partly because of legal advice that HMG could not introduce measures under these regulations relating to the care of children once they were in the care of organisations overseas.
2. there was, however, a widely-held view in policy discussions at the time that sending organisations in the United Kingdom had an on-going responsibility towards children they had emigrated overseas, including requesting regular reports on their progress and welfare from receiving institutions.
3. these policy discussions were clearly known to organisations involved in sending child migrants from Scotland, such as Dr Barnardo's Homes, the Fairbridge Society, the Catholic Child Welfare Council, the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, the Royal Over-Seas League, the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Services and the Salvation Army. From 1949, the Home Office was in discussions with these organisations as part of the process of preparing draft s.33 regulations and in the autumn of 1951, these voluntary societies indicated their agreement with key standards in the selection and post-migration monitoring of child migrants through the umbrella organisation, the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration.
4. although, in the summer of 1954, the Home Office eventually chose not to introduce these s.33 regulations, there does not appear to have been any reason for voluntary societies to assume that expected standards set out in the draft regulations were no longer relevant to their work. This is exemplified by the decision of some voluntary societies, such as Dr Barnardo's Homes and the Fairbridge Society to try to maintain proposed standards for post-

migration monitoring even though there was no regulatory requirement for them to do so.

5. although Dr Barnardo's Homes and the Fairbridge Society did seek to operate systems through which regular reports would be returned on the welfare and progress of individual children, flaws existed in these systems and cases of abuse did occur in relation to child migrants sent under of the auspices of both of these organisations. This suggests that whilst regular reporting on child migrants' welfare and progress once overseas could have been considered a necessary element in safeguarding their welfare, in practice the existence of such systems was not, by itself, sufficient to protect child migrants.
6. the organisational structures through which Catholic Scottish child migrants were emigrated to Australia were complex. Various organisations were involved including: religious orders running residential institutions (the Sisters of Nazareth and the Good Shepherd Sisters), the Catholic Child Welfare Council (whose remit normally only covered the care of children in England and Wales), the Australian Catholic Immigration Council, and the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement for Scotland and Northern Ireland. Other organisational names are also used, particularly in immigration documents for Scottish child migrants who sailed in the autumn of 1947. The apparent confusion over the names of organisations taking responsibility for this work is not something that is evident in the work of any other sending bodies from the United Kingdom and it has not been possible to verify the existence of some of the organisations named in those documents.
7. despite only normally having a remit for the care of children in England and Wales, the Catholic Child Welfare Council appears to have taken on an administrative role in relation to Scottish child migrants as well and is sometimes named as their sponsoring organisation on immigration forms. Members of the Catholic Child Welfare Council were aware of concerns that had been raised about Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia during the Second World War. They were also aware of a commitment that had been made by a Catholic official responsible for organising child emigration in that period that no further boys would be sent to the Brothers' institutions after the war until Catholic officials from the UK had undertaken their own inspection of them. This inspection never subsequently took place. The Catholic Child Welfare Council was aware of expectations around standards of selection and post-migration monitoring set out in the draft s.33 regulations and had indicated its agreement with these, but does not appear to have successfully implemented a comprehensive system of monitoring for all child migrants and institutions in subsequent years.

8. although child migration work was discussed at both the Social Services Committee of the Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh and the Scottish Catholic Bishops Conference, it has not been possible to find any evidence of post-migration monitoring being undertaken by the Catholic Church in Scotland.
9. the Sisters of Nazareth do not appear to have undertaken any comprehensive checks on the welfare of children they emigrated to Australia. Although the two Nazareth Houses in Australia (at Geraldton and East Camberwell) to which Scottish child migrants were sent would have received periodic visitations from the order, copies of these which have been seen by the Inquiry do not provide any substantial comments on the welfare of child migrants. Half-yearly reports appear to have been sent from these institutions to the Catholic Child Welfare Council but only from Nazareth House, East Camberwell, from 1956. The order did not undertake any regular monitoring of children it sent to the care of other religious orders in Australia (including the Sisters of Mercy and the Christian Brothers).
10. the Royal Over-Seas League does not seem to have undertaken any systematic monitoring of child migrants whom it sent to private households in Australia and New Zealand or to Dhurringile. HMG was aware that the League had little expertise in child-care or resources to monitor child migrants overseas and had, on that basis, refused to approve the League as a sending organisation until 1954 when it changed this decision under pressure from the Australian Commonwealth Government. The process by which the League appears to have sent over 100 children to private households in Australia, despite having a proposed scheme along these lines rejected by the Australian Commonwealth Government, remains unclear but may have involved the incorrect designation of their child migrants as returning CORB evacuees.
11. only limited records appear to be available of the child migration work undertaken by the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Services. The Moderator of the Church's General Assembly is reported to have visited Dhurringile in 1951 and formed a positive impression of its work. Annual reports of the Committee in some subsequent years make positive references to the progress of boys sent there which appear to be based on individual reports, although it is not clear how comprehensive or frequent these were. There was a significant disparity between these positive reports and the critical views of this institution taken by the 1956 Ross Fact-Finding Mission. Allegations of physical and sexual abuse against staff at the institution, including Superintendents in charge of it, further suggest the limitations of

relying on institutional self-reporting as a means of monitoring child migrants' welfare.

12. Quarriers appears to have relied on letters sent back from children they emigrated to the Burnside Homes in Australia in 1939 as their main source of information about their welfare. Some reports were received from Dhurringile about boys sent there from Quarriers in the early 1960s, but there is no indication of any further reports being sent about them after Dhurringile was closed in 1964. With regard to the 1939 party, Quarriers sought consent for children's emigration from their parents and guardians on the basis that they would be sent to the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong, in New South Wales, but this was not the institution to which these children were eventually sent. Whilst the Curtis report, Home Office and other child-care professionals emphasised the importance of maintaining contact between children in out-of-home care with their parents and other relatives, it is not clear that this was given a significant priority by Quarriers when making decisions about the emigration of boys sent in the early 1960s. Five boys were also sent to Dhurringile by Quarriers in the early 1960s despite psychological reports which took the view that emigration was not appropriate for them.
13. local authorities in Scotland, as in England and Wales, do not appear to have operated their own systems for monitoring child migrants sent from their care, but relied instead on information provided by the voluntary societies under whose auspices they were sent overseas. Although the small number of cases for which information is available make generalisations difficult, it appears that local authorities considered that their legal duty of care for a child migrant ended at the point at which they sailed overseas.
14. the Salvation Army emigration department in London received a number of complaints about the Riverview Training Farm, but continued to send boys there on the basis of assurances from Army staff in Australia. The Riverview Training Farm received particularly strong criticism in confidential comments made by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission. However, both HMG and the Salvation Army appeared willing to allow boys to be sent there on the grounds that they were older than most child migrants and would only be spending a period of months at the institution before being placed out for work in local farms.

Appendix 4: Issues concerning the selection, recruitment and approval of child migrants outstanding from previous Inquiries and Reports

This Appendix examines two issues concerning the recruitment of child migrants which have been raised, but not resolved during previous Inquiries on post-war child migration programmes.

The first issue concerns the process through which post-war child migrants were recruited from Catholic institutions across Britain. It is now understood that administrators acting on behalf of Australian Catholic bodies (namely Br Conlon, Fr Nicol, and Fr Stinson) recruited children directly from residential institutions run by religious orders. This occurred despite repeated requests from the Catholic Child Welfare Council that the selection of individual children from such institutions in England and Wales should only take place with permission from a diocesan child rescue official. No such request for diocesan permission appears to have been made in relation to children recruited from Catholic residential institutions in Scotland, however. The emigration of child migrants from England and Wales without such permission from diocesan officials (including the emigration of Scottish children at Nazareth House, Carlisle) raises a question as to whether they had appropriate consent from a guardian before being sent overseas. It may also reflect wider tensions or lack of co-operation between religious orders running residential institutions and the dioceses in which they operated. Given the connections that both Br Conlon and Fr Stinson had with Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, it is a concern that they may have been aware of risks to children's welfare in these institutions (including the risk of sexual abuse) before recruiting children from the United Kingdom to be sent to them.

The Appendix then goes on to examine the context for selection decisions about girls sent from Nazareth Houses in Scotland to Nazareth House, East Camberwell in Victoria. In particular, it examines whether the Sisters of Nazareth may have chosen to expedite the emigration of girls to fill vacancies in East Camberwell to avoid repayment of a substantial building grant to the Commonwealth Government. Primary archival material is reviewed which suggests that the Sisters of Nazareth may have made a clear commitment to the Commonwealth Government that they would make girls available from the United Kingdom to fill the 150-bed wing which the order had built with two-thirds funding from the Commonwealth and State Governments. By 1953, it was clear that the number of girls being made available to go to East Camberwell was far smaller than had been planned and Fr Stinson reportedly told the Superior General of the order that the Commonwealth Government might demand repayment of its grant if more girls were not forthcoming. Having noted an apparent attempt by the order to send more girls to East Camberwell in the summer of 1953, the Appendix goes on to note the case of one of the witnesses to the Inquiry who was sent to Nazareth House, East

Camberwell in the summer of 1954. She was migrated despite having to wear callipers from a young age due to a childhood illness. Evidence is noted that the Commonwealth Government queried how the child had been judged medically fit for emigration when her disability should have disqualified her. In the context of this child's medical history and wearing of callipers at Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, it does not seem plausible that the Mother Superior at Kilmarnock was unaware of her medical history. This child's departure to Australia without her callipers suggests the order may have prioritised the need to fill spaces for child migrants at East Camberwell over compliance with expected health requirements for emigration to Australia. This case is set in the wider context of examples concerning other sending organisations in which funding to expand residential vacancies for UK child migrants from governmental bodies and voluntary societies in Australia seems to have created a sense of moral obligation to provide children to fill those. It is also noted that the failure to provide a medical history in the case of this child is not unique with regard to the Sisters of Nazareth and that none of the children emigrated from the care of the order in 1947 appear to have had any information about their medical histories sent out with them.