1	Friday, 27 November 2020
2	(10.00 am)
3	LADY SMITH: Good morning.
4	Mr Peoples.
5	MR PEOPLES: Good morning, my Lady. The next and final
6	witness in this hearing is John Swinney.
7	LADY SMITH: Thank you. (Pause)
8	Good morning. Could we begin, please, by you
9	raising your right hand and repeating after me
10	MR JOHN SWINNEY (sworn)
11	LADY SMITH: Please sit down and make yourself comfortable.
12	Mr Peoples will tell you about the red file in a moment
13	but most of what you may need to look at should come up
14	on the screen in front of you.
15	One question I have is how would you like me to
16	address you in the hearing?
17	A. Whichever name or title or whatever would be suitable to
18	you, my Lady.
19	LADY SMITH: That doesn't tell me what you are most
20	comfortable with. Could we not use Deputy
21	First Minister because it is quite cumbersome. John or
22	Mr Swinney?
23	A. John will be fine.
24	LADY SMITH: Well, John, I will hand over to Mr Peoples and
25	he will take it from there, if you are ready.

1		Questions from MR PEOPLES
2	MR	PEOPLES: Good morning, Mr Swinney.
3	A.	Good morning.
4	Q.	As her Ladyship said, there is in front of you a red
5		file which contains a hard copy of a witness statement
6		you have previously provided to the Inquiry before
7		giving evidence today. In front of you, you will also
8		see that there is a copy of that statement displayed on
9		the screen. If I put up any other document in the
10		course of the evidence today, it will appear on the
11		screen in front of you.
12		Can I begin by asking you to turn to the final page
13		of your statement and can you confirm that you have
14		signed this statement I think on 5 November of this
15		year, and can you also confirm that you have no
16		objection to your witness statement being published as
17		part of the evidence to the Inquiry?
18	A.	I have signed that document, Mr Peoples, and I am happy
19		for it to be published.
20	Q.	I think you say you believe the facts as set out in your
21		witness statement are true?
22	A.	I do believe that, yes.
23	Q.	Can I begin by going to perhaps the start of that
24		statement. You are John Swinney, and you have been
25		a member of the Scottish Parliament since 1999, is that

1 correct?

2 A. I have, yes.

3	Q.	Your background I think before politics was in business
4		and economic development, is that correct?
5	Α.	That is correct, yes.
6	Q.	(Pause) I think you tell us in paragraph 4 of your
7		statement
8	LAD	Y SMITH: We have some feedback coming through. Sorry,
9		John, this has never happened before. (Pause).
10		Thank you.
11	MR	PEOPLES: If we go to paragraph 4, as you tell us you
12		were elected to the Scottish Parliament, and you did
13		have a spell as a Member of Parliament in the
14		House of Commons between 1997 and 2001 also?
15	Α.	That is correct, yes.
16	Q.	You were leader of the Scottish National Party from
17		September 2000 to September 2004?
18	Α.	That is correct.
19	Q.	When the SNP administration came to office in May 2011,
20		you were appointed as Cabinet Secretary for Finance,
21		Employment and Sustainable Growth, and you served in
22		that role until November 2014?
23	Α.	In your opening remarks there, Mr Peoples, you said
24		May 2011. It was May 2007 when the current Government
25		came to office.

1	Q.	Yes, sorry, there were two elections
2	Α.	Yes. So 2007, re-elected in 2011.
3	Q.	Yes, there was an election in 2007, my apologies, and
4		then there was a further election in 2011, in May. On
5		both occasions the Scottish National Party formed
6		an administration, I think in the first case it was
7		a minority administration?
8	Α.	That is correct.
9	Q.	And I think in the second it wasn't?
10	Α.	In the second it was a majority administration, but
11		I served continuously in Government from May 2007.
12	Q.	In the capacity as Cabinet Secretary for Finance,
13		Employment and Sustainable Growth?
14	Α.	Yes.
15	Q.	So you were reappointed after the election in May 2011?
16	Α.	I was, yes.
17	Q.	You tell us also that you were appointed by the current
18		First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, as Deputy
19		First Minister in November 2014 and have, since then,
20		served as Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Constitution
21		and the Economy from November 2014 until May 2016, and
22		you have served in your present post as Cabinet
23		Secretary for Education and Skills since May 2016, is
24		that correct?
25	Α.	Both are correct, yes.

Q. Again by way of introduction, I think you tell us that
 when you became Cabinet Secretary for Education and
 Skills in May 2016, you took on specific responsibility
 for issues related to the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry
 that fall within the remit of Scottish Government?
 A. That is correct, yes.

Q. I don't intend to go through every paragraph of your
statement today. We have it, it's evidence, we have
read it, and we will consider it in due course also.
But there are some issues I would like to pick up with
you, if I may, and I will try and flag up the paragraphs
that I am interested in, but if you want to add anything
please feel free to do so.

14 In paragraph 6 you say a little about the public 15 petitions process. We have heard quite a lot of 16 evidence in this Inquiry about the Public Petitions 17 Committee, obviously against a background of Chris Daly submitting a petition in August 2002 calling for 18 essentially three things, an investigation or inquiry 19 20 into past abuse, apologies from various State bodies and 21 others, religious orders and so forth, and also seeking 22 some form of sympathetic listening forum that would 23 listen to the accounts and experiences of people who had 24 been in care and suffered abuse. So these were the 25 broad aims I think of that Petition, as I think you will

1 be very familiar.

So far as the Petitions Committee is concerned, do 2 you consider that that Committee has been, and is, 3 an important committee of the Scottish Parliament, and 4 5 can you maybe explain why? I think it is a very important committee of the 6 Α. 7 Scottish Parliament. As you referred to earlier on, Mr Peoples, I had experience in the House of Commons 8 9 before the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, and 10 one of the stark differences between the House of Commons' process at the time and the 11 12 Scottish Parliament as it was established was in the 13 manner of how representations or concerns by members of 14 the public could be heard directly by Members of Parliament. 15

16 So in the House of Commons, if a Member of 17 Parliament had a petition of concern from their constituency, for example, or from a particular interest 18 that they followed, they would essentially -- if my 19 memory serves me correctly, after votes at 10 o'clock at 20 21 night there was an opportunity to catch the eye of the 22 Speaker, to essentially read out the petition from your 23 constituents. That would be read out. You would then 24 process from your place in the House of Commons Chamber 25 to the Speaker's Chair and you would deposit the

petition in a bag at the back of the Speaker's Chair and
 that was the end of the matter.

The Public Petitions Committee concept I suppose has 3 its origins in that, of the ability of individuals to 4 make direct representations through Members of 5 Parliament to the Parliamentary process, but with one 6 7 very -- or two very significant differences. First is that members of the public were able to make those 8 9 representations directly to Parliament through the 10 submission of a petition, as Mr Daly did on this particular occasion, but then also there was a process 11 12 for the pursuing of those petitions through the 13 Parliamentary process. So what invariably happens is 14 a petition is submitted to the Public Petitions 15 Committee, they will consider that, they will probably 16 seek information from the Government if that is 17 appropriate, or they will perhaps ask another subject committee of the Parliament to consider some issues. So 18 in my current role we reasonably frequently receive 19 petitions which have come from the Public Petitions 20 21 Committee to us within the -- to the 22 Education Committee, and then to us within the 23 Government for us to make representations about, and 24 ministers can be called to either a subject committee or 25 the Public Petitions Committee to make representations.

1 I think what has led up to this Inquiry is I think an illustration of the power and effectiveness of the 2 public petitions process because a citizen of our 3 country has made a petition to the Public Petitions 4 5 Committee, it has been considered through Parliamentary processes, it has been responded to by Government, and 6 7 it has culminated in an inquiry which is looking in a forensic way at the issues that were raised in 8 9 Mr Daly's petition. And that is just one example of 10 where the Petitions Committee process has been 11 successful in raising concerns felt by members of the public, and to get due attention to them in the fashion 12 13 that they should have that attention. 14 Q. I will maybe come to perhaps the time it has taken to 15 get to this point or the culmination of the petition, 16 but can I move on for the moment to paragraphs 8 and 9 17 where you are discussing the First Minister's Apology on

18 1 December 2004. You can take it we have heard quite 19 a bit of evidence about events up to 2004, indeed up to 20 2014, so there is a familiarity with some of the key 21 steps and events in the period we are considering in 22 this hearing.

23 Can I just take it that what you are saying there 24 about the impact of the Apology is something that you 25 are expressing as a personal opinion as someone who was

1 in the Chamber at that time, because I think you say it came across as a genuine and substantive apology. You 2 are not speaking on behalf of Scottish Government, you 3 are just saying "That is how it came across to me"? 4 5 Yes, I was in the Chamber when Mr McConnell delivered Α. the statement. I felt -- I suppose my comments are set 6 7 within the context of the time, because the context of the time was that we were acutely aware, as Members of 8 9 Parliament, that there had been quite a lot of toing and 10 froing between the Public Petitions Committee and the 11 then Scottish Executive about trying to get the issue of 12 the inquiry demand, and the demand for an apology 13 addressed by the Government, and there was considerable 14 frustration on the part of the Public Petitions 15 Committee that it was taking too long to get a response 16 to the petition, and a lot of that is narrated in the 17 statement that the Scottish Government has given of the sequence of events over that period. 18 19 LADY SMITH: John, I'm sorry to interrupt you, and I think 20 I know what your answer is, but for those who don't

21 understand the way things work, when you say there had 22 been quite a lot of toing and froing between the PPC and 23 Scottish Executive about this issue of the inquiry, how 24 was it that you knew that at that time? 25

A. It was what I would describe as Parliamentary discussion

1 and chit-chat. So in the circumstances that led up, for example, to 1 December and the Public Petitions 2 Committee debate on this subject, there was a lot of 3 discussion within Parliament about whether that debate 4 should take place. There are relatively few 5 opportunities for Committee debates, debates on 6 7 Committee matters to take place. There is a discussion process amongst Conveners of Parliamentary Committees 8 9 about essentially who should get that time --

10 LADY SMITH: They bid for a slot.

11 They bid for a slot. And at that time I was a Convener Α. 12 of one of the committees, I was a Convener of the 13 European and External Relations Committee, so I was 14 privy to the discussions that were going on about, well, 15 what should be the topic that comes up on 1 December? 16 Mr McMahon, who was the Convener of the Public Petitions 17 Committee, was pressing very firmly to get that debate 18 on the agenda, largely I think because the Committee was 19 frustrated at the amount of time it was taking to get answers out of Scottish Executive at the time. 20 That 21 difficulty is narrated in the Government's submission to 22 the Inquiry, my Lady, which I think illustrates the 23 persistence of the Public Petitions Committee process, 24 because they wanted this issue aired, and that was then 25 pressing for the debate to be had on that date. Then,

1 of course, the fact that that debate was happening 2 I think precipitated the need for Mr McConnell at the time to say something else on behalf of the 3 Scottish Executive at that moment. 4 LADY SMITH: That is very helpful. Thank you. 5 6 MR PEOPLES: You give your recollection of how it came 7 across to you, the Apology. Can I put this to you --A. Can I -- forgive me. If I may, my Lady, if I could 8 9 perhaps complete the answer I was going to give to 10 Mr Peoples.

In hearing that, what was said by Lord McConnell at 11 12 the time, knowing how much of a pressure there had been 13 to get something said on the Parliamentary record, it 14 sounded to me quite substantive and genuine because of 15 how much pressure I knew was going on behind the scenes 16 to get something said. So just hearing those words as 17 they were said, and as they were responded to by my party at the time with the words of the then Deputy 18 19 Leader of the SNP, Nicola Sturgeon, those words were 20 embraced by us as being a genuine statement on 21 the Scottish Executive's part.

Q. I suppose, and you will be familiar with this, history
can be a harsh judge, and I suppose in terms of
apologies, the views that ultimately matter most are
those to whom the apology is given, whether immediately

1 the reaction of that section and also no doubt over 2 time. I think we have certainly heard some evidence to 3 the effect that perhaps, whatever was felt at the time, 4 there are those who were not entirely satisfied with 5 either the wording of the Apology or what accompanied it 6 at the time in terms of measures that were announced on 1 December.

8 I don't want to take that up with you, but I just 9 make that point. I don't know whether there is anything 10 you want to say in response?

11 A. I would, because I suppose I understand clearly in the 12 point that you make, Mr Peoples, that it doesn't really 13 matter, frankly, what I think about the Apology, it 14 wasn't an apology to me, it was an apology designed to 15 address survivors, and if survivors felt that this was 16 an inadequate response, then it was an inadequate 17 response in my view.

The second point is that of course with the passage 18 19 of time and with the scrutiny that this Inquiry 20 provides, we now know what was being thought about in 21 the motivation of the Apology and what were the 22 considerations being borne in mind. Again, in the 23 narration that the Scottish Government has provided to 24 the Inquiry, it is quite clear that there was a lot of 25 careful wording going on around about that Apology.

1 So I suppose there are two observations: the first that if survivors were dissatisfied with that Apology it 2 says to me the Apology was not good enough, however it 3 sounded to me at the time. And, secondly, with what we 4 5 now know, there was a lot of careful wording going on at the time to, I suppose, position Government as best as 6 7 Government could be positioned at the time, and that doesn't feel to me that it was -- that that was 8 9 appropriate, because what was needed was a forthright 10 apology to people who had suffered in our country and they should not have suffered. 11

12 That is a very direct acceptance of responsibility 13 that the State has to take on and I don't think that was 14 represented by the Apology that was given in 2004, which 15 is why I have returned to these subjects in what I have 16 said to Parliament subsequently.

17 LADY SMITH: So when you are talking about a lot of "careful 18 wording" going on that you know from reading the 19 document you have referred to, you will be have been 20 aware from that that there was legal advice being given, 21 and legal advice being given late in the day, as to what 22 the risks were of certain forms of words and what 23 emerged on it on that advice.

A. Yes, I am aware of that from the narration that -LADY SMITH: Yes.

1 A. I wasn't aware of that at the time.

2 LADY SMITH: No, I am not suggesting you would have been. I became aware of it when the narration of the timeline 3 Α. of all of this was produced by the Government. 4 5 LADY SMITH: And we have heard that in evidence, indeed we have seen what the advice was. 6 7 A. Yes. But I think the point you make, my Lady, about the fact that the legal advice was provided late in the day, 8 9 I think illustrates the point or substantiates the point 10 I was making earlier that there was -- there was a bit of a hurry to get all of this together, because the 11 Public Petitions Committee was putting pressure on to 12 13 get this issue addressed, and therefore it was all being 14 done in a very compressed timescale to address that 15 fact. I think, if my memory serves me right, the advice

16 from the then Lord Advocate came the day before the 17 Apology was given to Parliament.

Now, on an issue of this magnitude, of this 18 19 significance, of the need to say properly to survivors 20 that the State failed those individuals, I think that 21 was awful late in the day for that advice to be rendered and for it to be considered in relation to such 22 23 a monumental moment that survivors were looking for. It 24 wasn't a surprise, it had been there from Mr Daly's 25 petition, and I think it was just very late in the day.

1 LADY SMITH: Thank you. Mr Peoples.

MR PEOPLES: If I can move on. You offer I think some 2 observations at paragraph 14 about calls for an inquiry 3 and how things may have, to some extent, guietened down 4 after the Apology and debate, and you offer one or two 5 factors that might explain that so far as you are were 6 7 concerned. I suppose one general point you are making, and it's maybe a point that applies to a number of major 8 9 issues, is that if you want Government to sit up and 10 take notice, it helps greatly to have both the "media platform", I think is the expression you use, and the 11 12 Parliamentary platform giving their active support, and 13 indeed their continuing support, to keep the momentum 14 going. And I think you maybe sensed that it appeared, 15 to you at least, that maybe that impetus "diminished", 16 I think is the word you used, in the period after the 17 Apology itself. Was that your sense?

A. That was my sense, that the Apology was given and there
was almost a sense of the attention moved on to other
issues. And there are always other issues that are
predominating in public debate, either in the media or
in Parliament.

I suppose what I was narrating in my answers just a second ago was that a head of steam had been built up by the Public Petitions Committee, led by Mr McMahon,

1 and it got to that moment in Parliament where the 2 Apology had been given, and then I think the sense was that was it, and the heat went out of it. 3 Q. Although, in fairness, we have heard that during the 4 period from 2004, December, through to the new 5 administration, things were going on, the Shaw Review, 6 7 Scottish Law Commission Review. So it wasn't as if things weren't happening, but to some extent maybe they 8 9 were less in the public eye? 10 I certainly wouldn't want to create the impression that Α. there was nothing happening, there was a lot of very 11 12 good work that was taken on post-2004. But the only 13 observation I am making in that part of my statement is 14 that the intensity of focus and pressure wasn't there in a visible sense. 15 16 Q. If I could move forward to the period from 2007 through 17 to 2014 which you deal with in your statement. As regards that period you were throughout that period, 18 19 albeit as a result of two elections, you were the 20 Cabinet Secretary for Finance during that whole period, 21 is that right? 22 A. I was, yes. 23 Q. Can I just be clear that what you are saying in your 24 statement that begins on these matters at paragraph 11 25 as regards that period, you are essentially offering

1		what might be termed personal recollections as a sort of
2		insider who was a member of the administration during
3		that period who was sitting in Cabinet?
4	Α.	That is correct.
5	Q.	Is that a fair comment?
6	A.	Yes. I had no direct policy responsibility for any of
7		these areas of activity.
8	Q.	Yes, I think you say that in terms in paragraph 11, you
9		had no direct responsibility for policy issues relating
10		to historical child abuse. The way you put it, I think,
11		is your memory is that such issues were being "aired",
12		is the term you use or the word you use, at Cabinet
13		level, and I think you are indicating you had a general
14		awareness of the steps being taken in that period by
15		ministerial colleagues, is that right?
16	Α.	That's right, yes.
17	Q.	But it is no higher than that?
18	Α.	No, what happens at Cabinet is there is a section of the
19		Cabinet meeting every week which looks at and it's
20		referred to in some of the Government documentation as
21		the SCANCE process, I actually can't remember what it
22		stands for, but it is essentially current issues that
23		members of the Cabinet bring to the awareness of other
24		members of the Cabinet. Sometimes that is reporting
25		about things that have happened or things that are about

1 to happen and perhaps to raise issues which do not 2 require a full Cabinet paper to be brought on particular issues, and it is to essentially advise colleagues, to 3 air issues and to seek agreement of Cabinet that members 4 of the Cabinet are comfortable with the direction of 5 travel. 6 7 Q. So it's giving them a general awareness from particular departments, particular ministers, of what is going on 8 9 or what might be about to happen that the whole Cabinet 10 should perhaps at least be aware of? 11 Α. Yes. 12 Q. So far as what was going on in that period in relation 13 these issues of historical child abuse and policy 14 decisions, I suppose you would accept that those 15 directly involved in such issues, including any Cabinet 16 members that had specific responsibility, would be 17 better placed than you to give a sharper picture of the situation in that period? 18 19 I would say that was fair, yes. Α. 20 Indeed we have heard from Mr Russell. He was quite 0. 21 intimately involved I think in 2014, for example, so he 22 has a pretty clear recollection of how things went at 23 that time, and that would be an example? 24 A. Yes, exactly. 25 Q. You have some comments on what is described rather

loosely as the time bar issue. I only say that because we have had some evidence that one has to be very careful with terminology, that "time bar" can perhaps conceal fundamental distinctions between prescription and limitation, but I don't want to push that too far with you and I appreciate you are not a lawyer.

7 Your own recollection, and again this is a personal 8 recollection, at paragraph 13, and you are not speaking 9 I think here on behalf of Scottish Government, is that 10 the Cabinet was genuinely sympathetic in relation to 11 that issue, and that is how you put it.

The response might be to that, from a survivor 12 13 perspective, being sympathetic is not enough, they 14 wanted action. Do you want to comment on that? 15 A. My use of the phrase "time bar", and forgive me if I am 16 not in the right space of terminology here, was essentially about -- was essentially making it possible 17 for individuals to not be thwarted by restrictions and 18 be able to raise court cases. 19

20 I feel as if I am treading into territory which I'm
21 not --

22 LADY SMITH: You are doing very well.

23 A. I am very pleased to hear that.

24 LADY SMITH: The idea being that you have still got the

25 card, you still have the right. Your problem is there

1 is a hurdle you are going to have to get over to enable you to assert that right in the legal process if the 2 three-year limit has expired. 3 A. Cabinet was very sympathetic to addressing that issue, 4 and has subsequently done so, but there was a lot of 5 cautionary words being expressed around the Cabinet 6 7 table about whether that was the right thing to do because of the precedent it may set in a whole variety 8 9 of other areas. 10 MR PEOPLES: So that was the sense you were getting: there were the wider implications that if you do it for one, 11 12 you have to consider whether it has a knock-on effect 13 for other situations where the same problem may arise? A. That's correct. 14 Q. 15 And you were getting those messages strongly, 16 particularly from those with some legal understanding of 17 these matters? A. I was. 18 Would that be fair? 19 Q. 20 That is fair, yes. Α. 21 But so far as the other aspect where time bar is Q. 22 concerned, prescription, by that stage I think the race 23 was run on prescription. The Law Commission had said 24 "We don't think you should change the law to revive

these claims that have been extinguished". And I think

25

- at that stage, as we've asked other witnesses, perhaps
 there was a search for another solution for that
 problem?
- A. That is right, and I think -- I didn't detect -- I don't
 think Cabinet was persuaded to take any different view
 to the view the Law Commission had taken about issues on
 prescription.
- 8 LADY SMITH: The Law Commission had been quite clear in 9 explaining the difference, namely, once a right had 10 prescribed that meant it didn't exist anymore -- it's 11 dissolved, you don't have the card anymore, if you 12 like -- and to give rights retrospectively would have 13 quite serious implications. It was not thought right to 14 do that in principle.
- 15 A. But what that also then gave rise to, my Lady, was 16 a requirement for us to consider what we should do about 17 people who found themselves in that situation where their claim had essentially been extinguished by time, 18 which is where we have then arrived at in relation to 19 20 the advance payment scheme, which has now been making 21 payments, and also the redress scheme that Parliament is 22 currently legislating for.
- 23 MR PEOPLES: Can I move on in your statement to something 24 you say as what you consider may have been a turning 25 point in terms of the issue of an inquiry. You describe

1 it as the revelations about Fort Augustus in 2013. Just 2 by way of background for those unfamiliar with this area, I think in July of that year, if I'm correct, 3 there was quite widespread coverage about allegations of 4 5 abuse at Fort Augustus Abbey School, and indeed there had been a programme by the BBC, broadcast on 6 7 29 July 2013, entitled "Sins of our Fathers", which looked at the school which was then run by the 8 9 Benedictine Order, is that right?

10 A. That is correct, yes.

Q. So it was getting a lot of media coverage at the time, and you seem to think that that seemingly had some impact on the issues of bringing out the prevalence or potential prevalence of abuse and so forth.

15 But can I ask you this: what was it about the 16 Fort Augustus coverage in 2013 that may have made the 17 Cabinet sit up and take notice, to use my expression? Because we have heard evidence in this Inquiry that for 18 19 many years before then there had been widespread coverage of historical abuse of children in 20 21 institutional care going back to the days before the 22 Scottish Parliament, and indeed we have been told during 23 this Inquiry by a number of witnesses that there was 24 a clear recognition in 2002, certainly on the part of 25 ministers when the Daly Petition was submitted, that the 1

problem was or was likely to be widespread.

So I am just wondering why Fort Augustus? Why not 2 Quarriers? Why not St Ninian's, Gartmore, De La Salle 3 in 2003, Quarriers in -- whenever. They had a number of 4 5 convictions. Can you help me with that? What I think was different about Fort Augustus is that 6 Α. 7 the revelations came at a moment where the Government of which I had been a member, and our predecessors, had 8 9 taken a number of steps to try to address the issue of 10 historical abuse, and the Inquiry is familiar with all of them, I won't recount them. 11

12 I think what Fort Augustus said to us was: 13 you haven't done enough. We are seeing this almost 14 piecemeal revelation of an unacceptable part of our 15 history as a country, and Fort Augustus was another 16 seminal moment in the piecemeal revelation of that 17 shameful part of our history. What it did to the Cabinet was to say to us: this has to be done properly, 18 19 it has to be done fully and comprehensively, and you can 20 only do that with an inquiry.

Q. We have heard evidence during the course of this hearing that the Scottish Human Rights Commission, who didn't exist in the good old days in 2002 but was established in 2006 and became operational at the end of 2008, had been commissioned by Scottish Government to produce

1 a human rights framework, and I don't want to go into 2 the detail of that, but ultimately it produced an action 3 plan and tried to put forward a comprehensive response 4 to issues arising from historical child abuse.

5 Was that something that Cabinet was alive to and 6 aware of and did that have any influence in the way 7 things were perhaps moving?

A. Yes, that formed part of the thinking that I was 8 9 explaining a moment ago of how we essentially were 10 taking a number of steps that we thought were effective in trying to address this part of our country's history. 11 12 But by the time we got to 2013/2014 we had realised we 13 hadn't done enough, we hadn't done this comprehensively, 14 which is why the debate I think shifted into support for 15 an inquiry into all of these issues.

So we hadn't -- although the Human Rights Commission had developed the thinking that was there, and we had taken forward some parts of that, we hadn't taken forward all parts of that, particularly around the issue of accountability, and that was an issue which then had to be addressed through the commission of an inquiry of this nature.

LADY SMITH: John, by the time we are talking about, which
is around "Sins of our Fathers" being broadcast in the
summer of 2013, over three years had passed since the

1 Scottish Human Rights Commission had reported as a result of being asked to produce a framework around 2 which the pilot Time To Be Heard would work. 3 A. Yes, and I think I would -- how I would explain that is 4 5 that we were taking forward elements of that process that we thought would address the issues of substance 6 7 that lay behind the experience of survivors and what had given rise to the human rights framework. But what I 8 9 would have to accept today is that we had done that in 10 a piecemeal fashion and we had not done it in a sufficiently comprehensive fashion. 11 12 LADY SMITH: Mr Peoples. 13 MR PEOPLES: Can I move on to another matter which has been 14 explored in the context of the present hearing. You 15 address this matter at paragraphs 22 to 24 of your 16 statement, it's the issue of potential cost of 17 an inquiry and whether cost was a strong factor in relation to that matter. 18 19 Would you accept that we really need to ask those 20 with direct responsibility for issues relating to 21 historical abuse of children in institutional care 22 whether, in making particular decisions, cost was for 23 them a strong factor? That is really what we need to 24 do, don't we? 25 A. Yes, I think that is a fair question, yes.

1 Q. Perhaps you could confirm that prior to 2014, no one came to you as Cabinet Secretary for Finance and asked 2 you to find the money for an inquiry or indeed, for that 3 matter, the money for a financial redress scheme? You 4 5 weren't getting those representations at that time? A. No, I was not. 6 On the question of an inquiry, the broader question of 7 Q. an inquiry, is it your recollection that there was not 8 9 until 2014 a situation where the Cabinet was asked to 10 decide whether or not to have a public inquiry? Because we have heard evidence about consideration at various 11 12 points in time, but I am struggling to see there was 13 ever a formal position where the Cabinet was asked to 14 decide yea or nay until 2014?

15 A. I think on that sharp question: will we have an inquiry 16 or not? My view would be Cabinet was not asked that 17 question until 2014. The issue of where an inquiry fitted into addressing the issues that we had to 18 19 confront as a country was certainly part of the discussion and the deliberations and the debate that was 20 21 going on, but it didn't crystallise into a sharp 22 question of: are we going to do this or not until 2014? Q. It could have done but it didn't? 23 It could have done but it didn't. 24 Α. 25 Q. At paragraph 27, just following this through, and we are

in 2014, you personally may have been persuaded in 2014 1 by Mike Russell's arguments in favour of an inquiry, and 2 I think that is what you are saying there, but he said 3 to the Inquiry yesterday I think that there were other 4 influential figures within Cabinet, including the then 5 First Minister Alex Salmond and the Cabinet Secretary 6 7 for Justice, Kenny MacAskill, as well as I think the Lord Advocate, it would have been Frank Mulholland at 8 9 that stage I believe. They weren't similarly persuaded, 10 as far as I understood from the tenor of his evidence.

11 And to some extent what you said previously in 12 paragraph 13, about the caution within Cabinet about 13 doing certain things, I don't know whether that confirms 14 what he is saying? I am just trying to put it: there 15 was a division of view on the merits of a public 16 inquiry, was there not?

17 A. There was in 2014, yes.

18 Q. A robust division --

A. Before I come on to answer that question, if I could go
 back to the connection to the caution being expressed on
 the time bar issue --

22 Q. Yes --

A. -- if I use that shorthand. The caution was about if we
do it for this, what is our argument about the other
circumstances? That was the only caution. It wasn't

1 that there was any deeper issue than that, it was more 2 about a discussion about if you relax time bar in this 3 circumstance, what is your argument to not relax it in 4 other circumstances? I wouldn't want to link that 5 discussion with this one.

LADY SMITH: So the problem with that is that you would 6 7 I think readily feel it would not be right to create a hierarchy of pursuers. Some pursuers are better than 8 9 others or more -- a pursuer suing for one type, let's 10 say clinical negligence, one type of wrong, is not as worthy of having the time bar relaxed as somebody suing 11 12 or having been abused when a child in care, and that 13 would be what you were grappling with?

14 I think that is a very fair illustration of the concerns Α. 15 that were being expressed in the earlier part -- I refer 16 in the earlier part of my statement about the 17 discussions around the question of time bar, that was very much the debate that was going on at that time. 18 19 MR PEOPLES: Before you leave that then, I appreciate there 20 is a different point being made, and you made that clear. Before we leave that, though, just in relation 21 22 to the idea of a hierarchy of claimants, some getting 23 preferential treatment, that is one argument against 24 singling out a group, but there was another argument 25 probably that was current at that time, that if you open

1 the door for one group and you feel under pressure to open for another, there is a huge cost implication 2 potentially, and I think that is something we get 3 a sense of. There were the slopping out cases, for 4 example, at that time, which were the subject of either 5 claims or potential claims, and I think we would be 6 naive to think that that didn't enter the minds of both 7 legal figures and others, that if we give this class 8 9 an open door, then we have another class that can make 10 the same argument, and we are going to end up with quite a large potential liability, and cost must to some 11 12 extent be a consideration.

LADY SMITH: And you wouldn't know what new class might come
round the corner later this year, next year or whatever?
A. I think these are the issues that were relevant to that
discussion, very much.

17 MR PEOPLES: Okay.

When it comes to the situation in 2014, certainly there 18 Α. was a difference of view within the Cabinet in the 19 20 summer of -- summer/early autumn of 2014 about whether 21 there should be an inquiry, and the Inquiry was 22 authorised in December after the change of 23 First Minister had taken place. So there was without a doubt a division of view within the Cabinet in the 24 25 autumn of 2014.

1 Q. I think Mike Russell in his evidence described it as quite a "robust" discussion. He didn't suggest it was 2 other than amicable, and he said that is politics for 3 you and that is the way it should be, but it was robust. 4 5 And perhaps there was certainly one school of thought that public inquiries, for a variety of reasons -- the 6 7 time taken, the costs involved, whether they lead to satisfactory outcomes -- these were the sort of factors 8 9 that those that didn't support a public inquiry were 10 urging perhaps in support of their argument, whereas Mike Russell was putting forward another perspective, in 11 12 particular having to look at what survivors want and how 13 it will serve their needs.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Is that a broad, fair --

16 A. Yes, I would say that.

17 -- interpretation of the respective positions? 0. There was a perfectly respectful debate within Cabinet 18 Α. 19 about this subject but there were two opinions, and one 20 argument was that an inquiry would not address the issues satisfactorily, that it would not deliver the 21 22 outcomes that survivors hoped for. And there was 23 another point of view put forward by Michael Russell 24 which would be informed heavily by his engagement with 25 survivors, which basically it was a view that we had to confront this issue as a country because we had to do
 justice to survivors, we had to enable them to have
 their experiences documented, understood and reflected
 on and responsibility accepted by the State for what had
 happened. He felt that had to be confronted.

At that time I found his argument persuasive, 6 7 and I supported him in Cabinet. Subsequent to that, obviously I found myself two years later in the role 8 9 that he performed at that time and engaging with 10 survivors. In the first meeting I had with survivors in my capacity as Cabinet Secretary for Education 11 12 I understood immediately, and I mean within minutes of 13 that meeting, why he had come to that conclusion after his interaction with survivors. 14

15 Q. Yes, I was going to ask you, and I think you have 16 anticipated, that one of the -- or perhaps the most 17 profound factor in influencing his view that there must be an inquiry was when he attended an interaction event 18 19 on 27 October, I think it was, 2014, and he spoke to 20 survivors, and he spoke yesterday about how that had --21 if he needed any convincing by then, that that left him 22 in no doubt of what the right course of action was.

I think you were saying you had perhaps undergone a similar sort of effect of direct engagement with survivors, that it's a very powerful persuasion, for

those that were making the case for an inquiry, to speak to the survivors and then you will realise why it's important?

A. Yes, I was convinced by Michael Russell's line of 4 argument at the Cabinet in the summer and the autumn of 5 2014 and I supported him in his efforts to secure 6 7 an inquiry. I have known Michael for about 40 years, probably, and I trusted implicitly the strength of the 8 9 argument he put forward on that occasion, because 10 I could hear from him, having listened to him for 40 years, I could hear in his voice what was -- what had 11 12 influenced his thinking, what had made this profound 13 impact on his thoughts, and I thought that was 14 a persuasive argument.

15 If I had had any doubts in my mind, my first 16 encounter with survivors in 2016 as Cabinet Secretary 17 for Education reinforced my view that he was absolutely right in 2014, and I only wish we had got there earlier. 18 Q. If I could move on. You have a section about the 19 20 current Inquiry at paragraphs 31 to 39, and I think 21 essentially what you are telling us is that you take 22 a close interest in the work of the Inquiry and the 23 evidence given by individuals who were children in care 24 and indeed the published findings of the Inquiry to 25 date. And I think, and you can tell me if I am wrong

about this, you are saying really there that you and
Scottish Government as a whole recognised the importance
of the work which the inquiry has been asked to
undertake, and indeed you say at paragraph 39 that
the Scottish Government will act on any recommendations
made by the Inquiry.

Do you want to make a comment on that whole chapterof your evidence?

9 I think, going back to the discussions in 2014, one of Α. 10 the points that Michael Russell advanced was the importance that the experiences of survivors were aired, 11 12 documented and addressed. And I think when I read --Lady Smith kindly gave me copies of the documents that 13 14 have been published by, the case studies, the three case 15 studies that have been published by the Inquiry and 16 I have read them, and the Inquiry has certainly aired 17 and has documented those findings and they are a very, very difficult read because of their contents. I think 18 19 that is important because I think the country has to 20 face this, and we have to face it once and for all.

21 When it comes to the final part of addressing it, 22 that is where the Government has a duty to follow the 23 work of the Inquiry, to look carefully at what the 24 Inquiry is identifying in the issues that have been 25 raised. Then obviously we will get to a moment where 1 the Inquiry will give us recommendations and we will
2 have to address those recommendations, and I take this
3 opportunity here to confirm on the Government's behalf
4 that we will address in full any recommendations that
5 come from this Inquiry.

Q. Can I move on to another part of your statement at 6 7 paragraphs 40 to 49 which is headed "Scottish Government's Current Commitments to 8 9 Survivors". You have set out in that section of your 10 witness statement a number of things that have been happening, and will happen. Am I right in thinking that 11 12 the point of doing that is that you wish to reassure 13 survivors and others that Scottish Government, during 14 the life of the Inquiry, is continuing to take steps to 15 address the needs of survivors, and I think you give 16 some notable examples of what is happening, one of which 17 is the financial redress scheme that is currently I think being legislated for in the Scottish Parliament. 18

19 So that is the purpose I think of that section of 20 your report, you go into various initiatives just to 21 say, well, we just didn't stop by announcing an inquiry, 22 we are still working separately on the needs as we 23 perceive them to be, and we obviously take note of 24 no doubt what is going on in the Inquiry, what the 25 findings are showing and so forth. But the work goes

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on, is that right?

A. Yes. The Inquiry is one part of what is necessary to do 2 for the country and the State to repair the damage that 3 has been done to individuals in the past. So the 4 5 Inquiry has that role, to go back to the characterisation that I said a moment ago, to air, to 6 7 document, and then to address, which will be between the Government and the Inquiry, the findings of the 8 9 Inquiry. So that is an important element, a vital 10 element, of what has to be done.

But there is other work that has to be done to repair the damage that has been done on the watch of the State to survivors and that takes a number of different forms. The work of Future Pathways, for example, is constructed to provide support to survivors in trying to help them to address some of the issues that they have experienced. There's a lot of good work.

I did a session some time ago, it was pre-lockdown, 18 19 so it was probably about a year ago I would think, where 20 I went with survivors to meet the people from 21 Future Pathways who provide the support to survivors to 22 understand myself what is that dialogue like. I came 23 away from that -- and I attended with survivors, I talked to them before I went in and I talked with them 24 25 afterwards. But what struck me on that encounter was

1 what the Future Pathways team shared with me, that they viewed their role to be to walk alongside survivors, and 2 I thought it was a beautiful way to express it, to walk 3 alongside survivors. So they were there not to 4 5 interrogate survivors or to see if they could tick particular boxes but to walk alongside them, help them 6 7 to find their way through the world which they might find more difficult because of what they have 8 9 experienced. I thought it was a beautiful way to 10 express what it is Future Pathways has to do to support survivors. 11

12 There's then measures such as the advance payment 13 scheme that we have already launched. I think over 500 14 advance payments have been made to survivors, these are 15 for people who are older or who are terminally ill. We 16 have just reduced the age threshold from 70 to 68 for 17 eligibility. Then there is the Redress Bill which, as you correctly say, Mr Peoples, is currently being 18 19 legislated for in Parliament.

20 But there is a crucial connection I think between 21 the Inquiry and the redress scheme, and that is that I 22 think the Inquiry, without doubt, is going to help to 23 provide an evidence base that will make it much easier 24 and much more straightforward to address the claims made 25 by survivors. Because the Inquiry, with all the

authority that the Inquiry brings under its leadership
from a member of the Inner House, is able to I think
make that journey much more straightforward for
survivors in the pursuit of claims because authority has
been given to experience and testimony as we wrestle
with those claims in the future.

7 So there is a connection between what the Inquiry does and the agenda that we are pursuing outwith the 8 9 Inquiry to properly address the damage that has been 10 done to survivors by the failure of the State. Q. On the question of a financial redress scheme, and 11 12 I don't want to go into the specifics going through 13 Parliament, it's an opportunity no doubt for people to 14 make representations and changes and suggestions and so 15 forth. But do you accept in relation to that step that 16 it has been far too long in coming? A. Yes. 17

Q. And on the question of an inquiry, would you be among
those who say, perhaps with the benefit of hindsight,
that a national inquiry should have been announced
earlier than December 2014?

A. I think it would have been better if that was the case,
Mr Peoples. I think with what we are now seeing the
Inquiry does and documents, I think we would have helped
survivors if we had got here earlier, and I apologise

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for the time it has taken for us to get to that point.

2 I think a number of what were individually sensible, rational and considered steps to try to support 3 survivors and to secure the outcomes that they wanted 4 were being taken. At no stage in the last, going back 5 to 2002, was nothing being done. Lots and lots of 6 7 things have been done. But I think if you look back at those -- well, the twelve years between Chris Daly's 8 9 Petition and the announcement of the agreement by 10 Cabinet to an inquiry, lots of things were done. There was hardly a period in there when there was nothing 11 12 happening. There was always something happening in this 13 respect.

14 The question we have to ask ourselves, and it is 15 a question I have asked myself, is: was it enough 16 cumulatively? Individual compartments were all 17 individually fine, but cumulatively was it enough? No, it wasn't. And I think we are now in a position with 18 19 the Inquiry, with the support services that are 20 in place, and with the advance payment scheme and the 21 prospect of a Redress Bill, subject to Parliamentary 22 approval. Obviously it is, as you correctly say, 23 a legislative proposal before Parliament just now. On 24 the assumption that Parliament makes legislative 25 provision for that then I think we as a country, and me

as a representative of the State, are beginning to
 address the failings of our country in the past.
 LADY SMITH: John, you are very frank, thank you, in
 recognising that you wish there hadn't been the delay
 that there had been.

6 As you have scrutinised the history of the progress 7 towards announcing the Inquiry at the end of 2014, are 8 there any particular matters you have identified that 9 were causative in that delay that could have been 10 avoided?

A. I think -- I think I have to look at the period and 11 12 reflect that the moments that have led to what I think 13 have been the boldest steps in the journey have come 14 about as a consequence of direct engagement with the 15 survivors. So Mr McConnell's apology in 2004 was 16 a direct consequence of the engagement with survivors, 17 with the Public Petitions Committee and the pressure that gave rise to that. The direct engagement of 18 19 Michael Russell with survivors in 2013/2014 gave rise to 20 the Inquiry.

21 So there are the two seminal moments, I would say, 22 in the journey, and they were prompted by engagement 23 with survivors. So the flipside of that coin, my Lady, 24 is we should have engaged more and better with survivors 25 to enable us to come to sharper conclusions, so actually

listening to people and hearing them and then saying:
 things have to be done. I think that is a big
 reflection I would have to take on the period.

I think the second thing, and that is quite a hard 4 5 judgment on the workings of Government. The flipside of that is that in any day of the week, and believe you me 6 7 this week, it has been one of those weeks, there's a lot of issues that have to be addressed within 8 9 Government on a constant basis. So there is a challenge 10 to make sure that we maintain all of the intensity of focus that is required to make sure that we can address 11 12 the issues that have to be addressed.

13 LADY SMITH: In this particular case what I am struck with 14 more and more is that I have heard from many, many 15 survivors telling me one of the problems when they were 16 children in care was either nobody listened to what they 17 were telling people, or trying to tell people about what 18 was happening to them, or they knew there was no point 19 in trying to tell them because nobody would listen.

Fast forward to 2002, Chris Daly's Petition, "Please listen to this". Not just "Please listen to this", "I am giving you what I think would be a useful recipe with how to address it". Fast forward again, two and a half years passes before the first step in listening to what he was asking for in that petition, namely,

1 an apology, but it is not everything that was being 2 asked for. Fast forward years before the elements of the petition are listened to again, and it's really not 3 until the end of 2014 that everything that these people 4 5 were asking those in power to listen to was listened to, and that is one of the abuses that they were complaining 6 7 about and one of the abuses that happened to them as children. It strikes me it's very particular to this 8 9 Inquiry, would you agree?

10 A. Yes, I would. And I was re-reading last night the case study findings that you published, my Lady, on Quarriers 11 12 and there is, in the "Reflections" section, just 13 an awful set of paragraphs about a carer who overheard 14 boys talking and raised this with the leadership of the 15 organisation, and it was all -- and it's about "We've 16 got to do it now. We've got to phone the police now we 17 must get the police in now", and it didn't happen. She wasn't listened to. She was a voice for the boys but 18 19 she wasn't listened to.

20 So I have to -- I think my reflection to you, 21 my Lady, is that the landmark moments here are when we 22 actually listened -- not just heard, not sat in 23 a meeting, but listened to survivors is when we got to 24 the right judgments.

25 LADY SMITH: Does that create a wider lesson for Government?

1 It does. There are of course, on all sorts of different Α. questions, competing views, they are not as seminal as 2 the issues with which this Inquiry is wrestling. As 3 a former Minister for Finance I would listen to people 4 5 on a constant basis wanting money for this and money for that and all the rest of it, so you have to make 6 7 judgments. So it's not always possible to accede to everybody's requests, but this is of a different order. 8 9 This is the nature of who we are as a society and what 10 we want -- how we want people to be treated within our 11 society and what we are prepared to confront as 12 a society. And the conclusion we came to in 2014 was 13 the only way we could properly confront this as 14 a country and as a State was to have an inquiry of this 15 nature.

16 LADY SMITH: Is it really a matter of listening, listening 17 properly with a view to understanding what it is people 18 are saying, then considering and then deciding, and even 19 if the decision is "I cannot do what you are asking me 20 to do", give that answer respectfully, appropriately and 21 with reasons?

A. Correct. I have read, and indeed the Government
reflects this in its narrative to the Inquiry, I have
read testimony from survivors of some of the ways in
which they have been spoken to or spoken about by

representatives of Government and I find it almost unreadable because it is disrespectful, it's contemptuous, and people should never be spoken to -anybody shouldn't be spoken to like that, least of all people who have had the experiences that survivors have had.

7 I will probably struggle to find the words to
8 properly explain how I feel about some of the language
9 that I have seen used, and not even some of the
10 language, I suspect some of the perhaps rolling of eyes,
11 or whatever, which is just completely unacceptable.

12 I am a Member of Parliament, I've been a Member of 13 Parliament for 23 years. I sit in front of members of 14 the public every day of the week -- well, I don't do it 15 just now we, do it on Zoom now. But I have been sitting 16 in front of members of the public every week for 17 23 years and it doesn't matter who they are or where 18 they have come from or whatever, they are entitled to 19 sit in front of me to be heard properly, with no rolling 20 of eyes, with respect. And if there is something I can 21 do for them I will do it, and if there is not, I will 22 tell them why I can't do it.

That is the bond of a Member of Parliament and that is what I think public representatives should do at all times.

1 LADY SMITH: Thank you. Mr Peoples.

MR PEOPLES: Can I pick up on a couple of things you said 2 there. This issue which is clearly -- as I say, it went 3 back decades, this issue therefore was a big issue and 4 5 in some ways, although we have heard evidence that cost was looked at and was perhaps a consideration in 6 7 decisions that were taken in response, is this one of these issues which really transcends money? It is not 8 9 about money, and you have just got to confront it, as 10 you say, and if it takes money then it takes money. You can't really see it in monetary terms. There are 11 12 some issues that we are faced with as a society or as 13 a politician and you can't really see money as a big 14 influence. Would you say this is one of these issues? 15 Α. Yes. I have seen quite a lot of traffic in the Inquiry 16 proceedings about money, and obviously I was the 17 Finance Minister for nine years, and so I was controlling the money and intimately close with it all. 18 19 Ironically -- and I have seen references in the

20 early period of the Government, of which I am a member, 21 to money being an issue. Ironically, in the period 22 after 2007, the financial issues were less acute than 23 they were in 2014. When we came to office in 2007, or 24 just shortly before that, I was pleasantly surprised to 25 find out there was £1.6 billion of public money that was being held in an account in the Treasury that hadn't
 been spent.

So when we came to office -- I stumbled across this 3 fact in autumn 2006 and stored it away thinking, well, 4 if I end up becoming the Finance Minister in May it will 5 be quite handy to have that available to us, and it was. 6 So we had our block grant arrangements, and there was 7 also £1.6 billion of money that hadn't been spent. 8 9 I found it quite surprising that that was sitting there. 10 So --

Q. Although you weren't approached, there was money you say 11 that was there that -- perhaps it was a hidden money 12 13 tree, perhaps some people hadn't picked up on that? 14 There was a hidden money tree at that time so we Α. 15 obviously used that. So the idea that an argument was 16 being proffered in 2008 or 2009 saying money is a big 17 issue, well, we had the ability, we had the ability to fund the financial priorities that my colleagues decided 18 19 upon as being important.

I always viewed my role as Finance Minister -- I had two tasks as Finance Minister: one was to make sure the Government's record for financial management was robust, so if the books didn't balance at the end of the year there was nobody responsible other than me, so that had to happen and I did that. But my second priority was to

help my colleagues to fund the policy priorities they 1 wished to take forward, and I think generally my 2 colleagues would take the view that I did exactly that, 3 I tried to find ways of funding the policy priorities of 4 5 the Government. But at no stage did anyone come to me and say, "Look, we want to have this Inquiry, can you 6 7 put the money up for it?" And actually, ironically, in the early period of our administration, that would have 8 9 been easier to fund than it is in the post-2014 period 10 where money is tighter.

Q. Notwithstanding the general financial crisis in 2008,
there was at that stage within Government access to
funds that would fund an inquiry?

14 I think if you look at the pattern of the public Α. 15 finances, in the aftermath of the financial crash, the 16 then UK Government actually -- although there was 17 enormous pressure on financial markets, the UK Government at the time was actually sustaining public 18 19 expenditure. Money only started to begin to tighten in the aftermath of the 2010 General Election, and even 20 then we didn't begin to feel the effects of that until 21 about 2012. 22

23 So I would say the tighter financial period is 24 actually post-2012 and the period before that --25 obviously there were of course many demands for finance

1 for particular things, I did my best to try to fund them, but undoubtedly I would say the period got tighter 2 in the aftermath of 2012. 3 LADY SMITH: So if you take 2008/2009, are you telling me 4 that officials weren't being told "We are in times of 5 austerity. You have to think about the cost of 6 7 everything you are recommending"? A. People would be getting a message about the need to be 8 9 careful with public finances, but in the actual 10 practical tightening of public expenditure, I wouldn't say that period was -- that period was not as 11 12 tough as it has been post-2012. 13 LADY SMITH: Do you remember whether officials were being 14 told anything about money supply and what they had to think of in terms of cost? 15 16 Α. We would be challenging, or I would be challenging 17 Departments of Government to make sure money was being used effectively. I was pressurising to get value out 18 19 of public expenditure. So, yes, I was doing that, 20 certainly, because I wanted to maximise the effect of 21 public expenditure. Now, that is different to saying to 22 people "You can't have money for this policy priority" 23 because, as I narrate in my evidence statement, there 24 were big policies commitments with big price tags that 25 we funded during that period, and I funded them because

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they were the right thing to do.

LADY SMITH: Isn't maximising the effect of public
expenditure always a good principle to be following in
Government, irrespective of outside circumstances such
as the crash of 2008 and so on?

A. Yes, it was. It's a central part of the tactics that 6 7 I used in the management of the public finances, that I was constantly challenging how we could get more value 8 9 out of the public expenditure that we were making, 10 because if we were successful in that we could afford to do other things, and that stretched the capacity. So 11 12 often there would be commentary about that period which 13 expressed a bit of surprise about how we were perhaps 14 able to afford certain new priorities, but we were able 15 to afford new priorities because I had stretched the 16 value of other priorities.

17 LADY SMITH: Thank you. Mr Peoples.

MR PEOPLES: The second point I wanted to raise, apart from 18 19 the issue of money, and you have helpfully explained the 20 whole context, and I think you acceded generally to my 21 proposition that some issues are not about money, 22 I think that was the sense of your answer. But the 23 second point you made, which was trying to reflect on 24 what factors may have contributed to the time it has 25 taken to get to where we are today, you did say that the 1 "boldest steps", that is your words, were points when 2 there was direct engagement with survivors, and you had 3 in mind the run-up to the Apology and the run-up to the 4 announcement of this Inquiry, which were two of the big 5 demands of the Daly Petition.

Can I see if I can refine that thought a bit 6 7 further, that it is not just direct engagement of Government, it was direct engagement between survivors 8 9 and ministers. Because Peter Peacock spoke to survivors 10 before the Apology on 23 November 2004, as well as officials doing so, and I think that obviously 11 12 Mike Russell has told us that he engaged with survivors 13 on 27 October 2014 directly. So it is not just even 14 about engagement, it was engagement by the people who take the decisions. They had the direct access to the 15 16 people who would benefit from those decisions. And 17 I think you are saying it seems that there were big steps taken following such engagement, and perhaps that 18 19 explains why those steps were taken then and why they 20 were perhaps bolder than some of the others. 21 I think that is probably fair although I wouldn't say Α.

I would exclusively accept that point. I think it is perfectly possible for engagement to be taken forward by officials on behalf of ministers, and for that to be properly conveyed to ministers so that ministers can

1 make a judgment. Because there are lots of my officials engaged with all sorts of people on my behalf and I will 2 then consider the output of that, because I simply don't 3 have enough hours in the day to do all the direct 4 5 engagement I would like to do. I do a lot of it, but I don't have all the hours in the day to do all that 6 7 direct engagement. So it is perfectly possible for those issues to be properly represented. 8

9 But reflecting on my own engagement with survivors 10 on this particular topic, I don't think it is possible to have conveyed to you in a submission what is the true 11 12 feelings and hurt of survivors. I think that is tough. 13 Q. Therefore maybe I can put it this way: while I do accept 14 that officials can no doubt give effect to or find out 15 something for a minister to take a decision, and you 16 can't see everyone that wants something done by 17 Government, but maybe I go back to my point about there are some issues that are not just about money, but there 18 19 are some issues where the direct engagement of the 20 decision-makers, the ministers, is essential, and maybe 21 I am putting to you a point that this was one. 22 A. That could be a fair point, yes, and I think -- but 23 there is a need for ministers to work out how they need 24 to spend their time and who they need to engage with to 25 make sure they have a proper understanding and command

1 of the issues that have to be addressed. So there may well be topics where that direct engagement is 2 an absolute requirement and others where it can be 3 undertaken more at arm's length. 4 5 LADY SMITH: One thing that occurs to me arising out of that exchange, John, is there will of course be circumstances 6 7 where such direct engagement as happens is between officials and the citizens concerned. When it comes to 8 9 a particularly sensitive matter, such as we are dealing 10 with here, would you agree with me it's really important to choose carefully the official or officials who are 11 12 going to have that engagement? 13 A. Yes, without doubt. I come back to one of the earlier 14 comments that I made about some of the survivor 15 testimony that the Government addresses in our narrative 16 to the Inquiry whereby there are words and phrases used 17 which are completely and utterly unacceptable. So that must make your point, my Lady, that those 18 19 comments have come from people who didn't do that 20 engagement properly because it is disrespectful. 21 LADY SMITH: So how do you stop that happening? 22 A. You have to make sure that you are choosing individuals 23 in particular roles, and this is a particularly 24 sensitive area of policy, that you choose people who can 25 ensure that they -- well, let me roll back a little bit.

1 Any public servant should operate in a fashion that is respectful of members of the public. So whether you are 2 dealing with historic child abuse or policy in our 3 schools or issues of policing, public servants should be 4 respectful of members of the public. So although I take 5 exception to those remarks that I have cited in the 6 7 submissions by Helen Holland, for example, if I read a statement which said that one of my officials had been 8 9 disrespectful to a member of the teaching profession 10 about something they had said, I would think exactly the same thing. So I make that point for the consistency of 11 12 how public servants need to operate.

13 When it comes to issues like this, I think we do 14 have to recognise that this is very, very tough 15 territory so the people that you are choosing to go into 16 this tough territory must be equipped to handle that. 17 They may need specialist training to enable them to do so, they may -- I would venture to suggest they need 18 19 a personality of a particular type that enables them to do that. 20

I am particularly fortunate just now that I have officials who are working in this area of policy where their commitment to survivors is, in my view, extraordinary in how they engage, what they do, how they are helping people. And their empathy is extraordinary.

They are respectful. They absorb the concerns and the 1 2 fears of survivors and they try to address them. They act, frankly, in a manner that I would want -- that I am 3 proud of about how they do that because of their 4 5 engagement. But I have to accept that has not always been the case, because the testimonies of Helen Holland, 6 7 David Whelan and Chris Daly contradict that and I accept that. 8

9 One of things that I now chair, I chair a national 10 steering group on trauma training with the objective of creating a trauma-informed workforce, which is broader 11 12 than the issues involved in the abuse inquiry but which 13 is looking at how the -- a whole host of different areas 14 of policy we have to understand better: the significance 15 of trauma and how trauma has affected individuals. I am 16 acutely aware of this in my role as Education Secretary 17 about the trauma that children can experience in their earliest days. I think the Inquiry is familiar with our 18 19 policy approach on Getting It Right For Every Child 20 and what that involves. That has been pursued through 21 a trauma-informed approach because we recognise that, 22 without that approach, you will actually never get 23 somebody over the burden of their trauma to make 24 recovery as a consequence, so there is an element to 25 which that training is required to do that.

1 LADY SMITH: Thank you.

2 MR PEOPLES: Can I ask one question arising out of that 3 before we have a break, if I may?

4 LADY SMITH: Yes, Mr Peoples.

5 MR PEOPLES: I take it that what you have said in answer to some of the points raised there about perhaps past 6 7 deficiencies and acknowledged failings, you are articulating I think, in a broad sense, that there is 8 9 an understanding of those failings, and indeed there 10 have been steps taken to address them, and you have mentioned some of the things that are being thought 11 12 about, and indeed the steering group.

13 So can we take it then that you can give some 14 reassurance today that the point has been noted and is 15 being addressed within Government, the past failings and 16 the deficiencies in engagement and treatment of 17 survivors at times, I don't think it is universal. A. There are examples which are cited in the evidence the 18 19 Inquiry has heard from survivors which are wholly 20 unacceptable, and I would take this opportunity to 21 apologise on the Government's behalf for those examples. 22 They should not have happened.

23 The point that my Lady puts to me about the 24 importance of making the correct choices about the 25 individuals who act on the Government's behalf is

1	a vitally important point and we have to make sure that
2	is present in all of the decisions that we make about
3	people that act on our behalf.
4	MR PEOPLES: I do not have too far to go but I think we do
5	need to have a break.
6	LADY SMITH: Yes, and not to forget the stenographers who
7	are working away in the background.
8	We usually take a morning break about now, John, if
9	that would work for you, so I will rise for about a
10	quarter of an hour. Thank you.
11	(11.27 am)
12	(A short break)
13	(11.46 am)
14	LADY SMITH: John, are you ready for us to carry on?
15	A. I am, my Lady.
16	LADY SMITH: Mr Peoples.
17	MR PEOPLES: Mr Swinney, you have a section in your witness
18	statement headed "Protection of Children from Abuse",
19	it's paragraphs 50 to 57. It may come up on the screen.
20	In that section you mention the very important issue of
21	protection of children in care now and in the future
22	from abuse.
23	Can I just pick up something you say at
24	paragraph 51:
25	"The Scottish Government offers to provide evidence

on changes in law and practice that have taken place
 since this Inquiry was established."

As you know, I think, the Inquiry's Terms of
Reference include a specific term, term 7, which
requires the Inquiry to:

6 "... consider whether further changes in practice, 7 policy or legislation are necessary in order to protect 8 children in care from abuse now or in future."

9 So I think you may take it that the offer will be 10 taken up at the appropriate time. I think maybe today we concentrate on those who were children in care in 11 12 the past, but you have set out some of the things that 13 have been happening in relation to current child 14 protection, and we have that evidence, but I am sure in 15 due course we can get a fuller picture of that. So 16 hopefully that reassures everyone, including you, that 17 the matter will be appropriately and properly addressed. A. Certainly. I think what I would say in that respect is 18 19 that obviously there has been a great deal of focus on the issues of child protection over the last --20 21 certainly throughout my Parliamentary career, and what 22 I note in paragraph 52 is that one of the areas of 23 continuity of policy that our Government took forward was the concept of "Getting It Right For Every Child" 24 25 which emerged from our predecessors, because we believed

1 that was the correct direction of travel. We have built on that and taken forward various other steps to enhance 2 child protection and, indeed, we regularly consider and 3 I see, as does the Minister for Children and Young 4 5 People, assessments by the Care Inspectorate on assessments of the effectiveness of child protection 6 7 arrangements in individual localities around the country. We see that on a regular basis from periodic 8 9 inspections and, as a consequence of that, at times, we 10 can require local authorities or child protection partnerships to enhance their practice if we are 11 12 dissatisfied with how that is being reported to us, and 13 we have done that on occasions. 14 Q. I think, without, as I say, going into the detail of 15 this, that one of the broad policy aims I think is not 16 simply to improve child protection in the narrower

17 sense, but to improve outcomes for children who are 18 looked after, looked after children, whether in a care 19 setting or looked after children in the community, and 20 I think that is a key component of the policy as well, 21 is that correct?

A. That's correct and we have focused very much on the
point -- and it comes back to the question of trauma
that we were discussing earlier on, that we have to
acknowledge, and this is at the heart of the "Getting It

1 Right For Every Child" policy, that what happens in the earliest days of a child's life can determine so much of 2 their prospects and their outcomes in the years to come. 3 So making sure that the support is effective in that 4 respect to assist those children is critical. But there 5 is also a need to be supportive of the family context in 6 7 which they are living, and that has been very much at the heart of the outcome of the Care Review, which has 8 9 resulted in the publication of "The Promise", which is 10 currently being enacted by the implementation team that I have appointed to take forward that area of policy. 11 12 That is the review chaired by Fiona Duncan? Ο. 13 Α. Correct, yes. One thing you do tell us, which is perhaps a significant 14 0.

15 move, is that the Scottish Government has recently 16 introduced the United Nations Convention on the Rights 17 of the Child (Incorporation) (Scotland) Bill into the Scottish Parliament on 1 September this year and the 18 19 Bill, if passed, will directly incorporate the United 20 Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as far as 21 possible within the domestic law of Scotland, is that 22 right?

A. That is correct, and the objective of that is to ensure
that practice in Scotland in all respects that would be
covered by the United Nations Convention on the Rights

1 of the Child is what is lived out by children within 2 Scotland. So the purpose of enactment is to ensure that 3 all public authorities are operating in a manner that is 4 consistent with what would be expected of them under the 5 UNCRC.

Q. Deputy First Minister, the final part of your statement
starts at paragraph 58 and it is headed "Response to
evidence of survivors". Can I ask you to give
a response on behalf of Scottish Government at this
stage in relation to these matters?

I will. I think as I have explained in the course of my 11 Α. 12 evidence this morning, I hope anyway, is that the 13 Scottish Government has taken very seriously the issues 14 that are raised by survivors, and have done since we 15 came to office and I think indeed these issues were 16 addressed also by our predecessors. But I think I have 17 to accept that at times some of the handling and the approach that we have taken forward to dealing with some 18 19 of those concerns have not been appropriately and 20 effectively handled and addressed, and indeed I have 21 made comments about the testimony of Helen Holland, 22 David Whelan and Chris Daly which cause me enormous 23 concern as to how they have experienced dealing with the 24 Scottish Government, and I would want to at this point 25 apologise unreservedly to any survivor who has felt they

have not been properly supported or dealt with by the
 Scottish Government in raising their concerns and their
 aspirations to have their concerns addressed.

What I would say is that at all times our approach has got to be respectful to individuals, and there are occasions where that has not been the case and it is not what I would have expected people to appreciate on our behalf.

9 I think also the Inquiry essentially looks over very 10 difficult territory for the country and the experiences of some of our fellow citizens have been wholly 11 12 unacceptable. So in commissioning the Inquiry what 13 I wanted to make sure was the case was that the Inquiry 14 had every opportunity to explore the experience of 15 survivors and to essentially hold those responsible to 16 account for those experiences; whether that is 17 the organisations that were directly involved in the delivery of what would be allegedly called "care" or the 18 19 Government for presiding over the arrangements in which 20 this was able to take its course. And, as I have 21 indicated to the Inquiry already this morning, in the 22 case study findings I think they give the platform that 23 is necessary for the testimony of survivors to be 24 clearly understood and addressed within our country, and 25 they obviously place a burden on Government to address

the issues that arise out of that testimony, which the
 Government will pledge to do.

Lastly, when I went to Parliament in 2018 to address 3 a number of these issues, I unreservedly apologised on 4 behalf of the Government of Scotland for the experiences 5 that survivors had. I reiterate that apology to the 6 7 Inquiry today. The State failed a lot of young people in the past; children and young people who were at their 8 9 most vulnerable and the State failed them. The State 10 has to take responsibility for that and make account for it, and I unreservedly apologised on behalf of the 11 12 Government and the State in Parliament in 2018 and 13 I reiterate that apology here today. 14 MR PEOPLES: These are all the questions I have for you this 15 morning, Mr Swinney, and I thank you very much for 16 coming and attending and giving the evidence today. 17 LADY SMITH: Are there any outstanding applications for questions? 18 19 John, that does complete all the questions we have 20 for you. Thank you so much for engaging with the 21 Inquiry, both in terms of your written statement and

22 coming here today to give oral evidence. I am very 23 aware obviously of how busy you are, but it was very 24 important to have you here, and I am very grateful to 25 you for that. I am now able to let you go.

1 A. Thank you.

2	(The witness withdrew)
3	LADY SMITH: Mr Peoples.
4	MR PEOPLES: That concludes the evidence in this particular
5	hearing. The plan is that there will be closing oral
6	submissions next Friday, a week today, and parties will
7	be asked to submit written submissions in advance of
8	that. I think they have been given notice of when they
9	are due. I think it is Wednesday at noon, but I may be
10	wrong.
11	LADY SMITH: I think you may be right about that. I just
12	don't have that in front of me.
13	MR PEOPLES: That is the plan. So we meet again here next
14	Friday to deal with those matters.
15	LADY SMITH: Final submissions next Friday. Thank you very
16	much for that. I will rise now until then, and to those
17	of you who have given up what otherwise would have been
18	a public holiday today, thank you very much for your
19	interest and attendance. Thank you.
20	(11.58 am)
21	(The Inquiry adjourned until Friday, 4 December 2020 at
22	a time to be confirmed)
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